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“THEY SAW A PROTEST”: COGNITIVE 
ILLIBERALISM AND THE SPEECH-
CONDUCT DISTINCTION 
Dan M. Kahan,* David A. Hoffman,**                      
Donald Braman,*** Danieli Evans,****                            
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski***** 
“Cultural cognition” refers to the unconscious influence of individuals’ 
group commitments on their perceptions of legally consequential facts. We con-
ducted an experiment to assess the impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of 
facts relevant to distinguishing constitutionally protected “speech” from unpro-
tected “conduct.” Study subjects viewed a video of a political demonstration. 
Half the subjects believed that the demonstrators were protesting abortion out-
side of an abortion clinic, and the other half that the demonstrators were protest-
ing the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy outside a military recruitment 
center. Subjects of opposing cultural outlooks who were assigned to the same ex-
perimental condition (and thus had the same belief about the nature of the pro-
test) disagreed sharply on key “facts”—including whether the protestors ob-
structed and threatened pedestrians. Subjects also disagreed sharply with those 
who shared their cultural outlooks but who were assigned to the opposing exper-
imental condition (and hence had a different belief about the nature of the pro-
test). These results supported the study hypotheses about how cultural cognition 
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753 (1994). 
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would affect perceptions pertinent to the speech-conduct distinction. We discuss 
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Anyone seriously interested in what this case was about must view that tape. 
And anyone doing so who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not 
to mention some other social protests, will be aghast at what it shows we have 
today permitted an individual judge to do. 
 —Justice Scalia, dissenting in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.1 
 
Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is somehow idio-
syncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting its contents. We are 
happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself. 
 —Justice Scalia, majority opinion in Scott v. Harris2 
INTRODUCTION 
In a 1950s social psychology experiment, students from two Ivy League 
colleges were instructed to evaluate a series of controversial officiating calls 
made during a football game between their respective schools. Researchers 
found that the students, from both institutions, were much more likely to per-
ceive error in the penalty assessments imposed on their school’s team than in 
those imposed on their rival’s. The students’ emotional stake in affirming their 
loyalty to their institutions, researchers concluded, had unconsciously shaped 
what they had seen when viewing events captured on film.3 This study is now 
recognized as a classic demonstration of “motivated cognition,” the ubiquitous 
tendency of people to form perceptions, and to process factual information gen-
erally, in a manner congenial to their values and desires.4 
Motivated cognition poses an obvious hazard for law. Sports fans are per-
mitted—even expected—to be partisan. But legal decisionmakers must be neu-
tral. Just as the integrity of a sporting contest would be undermined by uncon-
scious favoritism on the part of the referee, so the legitimacy of the law would 
likewise be compromised if legal decisionmakers, as a result of motivated cog-
nition, unwittingly formed perceptions of facts that promoted the interests and 
values of groups with whom they had an affinity.5 
 
 1. 512 U.S. 753, 786 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 2. 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J.) (citations omitted). 
 3. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). 
 4. See generally Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Moti-
vational Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 612 (2006); 
Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic Pro-
cessing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84 (1997); 
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990); Anca M. 
Miron et al., Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 768 (2010). 
 5. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral 
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 59-66 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan, Neutral Principles]. A number of recent studies 
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This effect could be particularly subversive of constitutional law. The Free 
Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses all mandate governmental 
evenhandedness. Within their respective domains, each forecloses the state 
from privileging particular affiliations, ways of life, or points of view and man-
dates that law be justified by its contribution to secular interests—physical se-
curity, public health, economic prosperity—valued by all citizens.6 But if 
decisionmakers (particularly adjudicators) unconsciously apply these provi-
sions to favor outcomes congenial to favored ways of life, citizens who adhere 
to disfavored ones will suffer the same array of disadvantages for failing to 
conform that they would in a regime expressly dedicated to propagation of a 
sectarian orthodoxy. This distinctively psychological threat to constitutional 
ideals, which we will refer to as “cognitive illiberalism,”7 has received relative-
ly little attention from commentators or jurists.8 
We performed an experimental study designed to help assess just how 
much of a threat cognitive illiberalism poses to constitutional ideals. The study 
focused on a discrete and recurring task in constitutional law: discernment of 
the line between “speech” and “conduct” for purposes of the First Amendment. 
Embodied in a variety of doctrines, the speech-conduct distinction aims to as-
sure that coercive regulation is justified on grounds unrelated to governmental 
or public hostility to disfavored ideas.9 Most importantly, the speech-conduct 
distinction has historically played, and continues to play, a vital function in 
preventing the government from invoking its responsibility for maintaining 
“public order” to disguise suppression of impassioned political dissent.10 Our 
 
examine motivated cognition in law. See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: 
Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent]; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Dan M. 
Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott 
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Janice 
Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 (2012); Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of 
Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: Legal Implications of Outcome-Driven Reason-
ing, 100 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1641022. 
 6. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1986). 
 7. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 
(2007). 
 8. For a provocative and insightful exception, see Sood & Darley, supra note 5.  
 9. See generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Govern-
mental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). 
 10. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not permit speech to be restricted on the ground that “an audience that 
takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace”); 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function of free speech under our system 
of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces 
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study furnishes strong evidence that this function is indeed highly vulnerable to 
the power of motivated cognition to shape decisionmakers’ perceptions of the 
facts that mark the speech-conduct boundary.  
The features of the speech-conduct distinction that make it susceptible to 
this influence, moreover, are shared by a host of other constitutional doctrines. 
The study results thus highlight the need to fortify constitutional theorizing 
with psychological realism. Normatively ideal standards for enforcing the Con-
stitution are of little value if applying them defies the capacities of constitution-
al decisionmakers.  
After presenting background discussion, we describe the study design and 
results. We then address the study’s normative and prescriptive implications. 
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The context for our study comprises three elements. The first is the speech-
conduct distinction in First Amendment doctrine. The second is the phenome-
non of “culturally motivated cognition.” And the third is the threat the latter 
poses to the former. 
A. “Speech” Versus “Conduct”  
Because the Free Speech Clause confers special protection on speech, First 
Amendment jurisprudence is said to “draw vital distinctions between words and 
deeds, between ideas and conduct.”11 Regulations of speech are subject to myr-
iad restrictions that regulations of conduct need not satisfy.12 
The division between “speech” and “conduct,” however, is notoriously 
problematic.13 Words are often the key—sometimes the exclusive—
 
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people 
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.”). 
 11. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
 12. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 777 
(2001).  
 13. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“[V]irtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can 
be performed for an expressive purpose—if only expressive of the fact that the actor disa-
grees with the prohibition.”); John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in 
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1482, 1496 (1975) (“Burning a draft card to express one’s opposition to the draft is an undif-
ferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression, and to outlaw the act is therefore nec-
essarily to regulate both elements.”); Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—
Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968) (arguing that the “distinction 
between speech and nonspeech has no content” and is “specious”). Thomas Emerson is the 
constitutional theorist most famously associated with the distinction. See THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).  
KAHAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2012 11:40 AM 
856 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:851 
instruments of prohibited forms of conduct, from price-fixing14 to treason.15 
Deeds such as lighting fire to an American flag or to a towering cross—not to 
mention violently assaulting a person on account of his race or sexual prefer-
ence—can potently express ideas. In short, we “do things with words and say 
things with actions.”16 Insisting that every act be definitively categorized as ei-
ther “speech” or “conduct”—a position John Hart Ely called the “ontological 
fallacy”—thus invites sophism and ad hocery.17  
One way to avoid this problem is to adopt instead what Ely referred to as a 
“teleological” conception of the speech-conduct distinction.18 Rather than di-
recting courts to determine whether a particular act is “really” expression or 
“really” conduct, this approach focuses attention on the government’s goal in 
regulating it. The “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is 
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”19 It therefore makes 
sense to treat a regulation as abridging speech whenever the government’s pur-
pose is to attain some good or state of affairs that reflects aversion to a disfa-
vored idea.20 If, in contrast, a regulation seeks to promote a good that can be 
defined independently of hostility to a disfavored idea, we can say that a viola-
tor, even if she intends to communicate a message, is being punished for engag-
ing in “illegal conduct,” not “for speaking.”21 
The Supreme Court has used the teleological strategy to distinguish 
“speech” from “conduct” across a diverse range of settings. The government 
can ban sleeping overnight in Lafayette Park to protest homelessness, for ex-
ample, not because sleeping just can’t be “speech,” but because the govern-
ment’s reason for the ban is “unrelated to suppression of expression”: “lim-
it[ing] wear and tear on park properties” justifies prohibiting overnight camping 
there regardless of whether the campers mean to express a message.22 
The government can criminalize the burning of draft cards,23 the Court has 
held, but not the burning of American flags.24 The basis for the distinction isn’t 
 
 14. Cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 427 (1990) (holding 
that boycott conducted to effect increase in prices is not protected by First Amendment).  
 15. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[W]ords can in some 
circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against 
treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets) . . . .”). 
 16. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 784 (emphasis omitted); see also Henkin, supra note 
13, at 79 (“Speech is conduct, and actions speak.”). 
 17. See Ely, supra note 13, at 1495-96. 
 18. See id. at 1496. 
 19. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 20. See Ely, supra note 13, at 1496-500; Kagan, supra note 9, at 428-32; Rubenfeld, 
supra note 12, at 777. 
 21. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 778 (emphasis added). 
 22. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 299 (1984). 
 23. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
 24. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.  
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that the latter is more speech-like than the former; indeed, both might be recog-
nized (and were in the 1960s) as cogent statements of opposition to a war. The 
difference stems from the government’s reasons for regulating them. Preserving 
ready proof of compliance with selective-service laws supplies a justification 
for prohibiting destruction of draft cards independent of any hostility toward 
the statement of dissent such behavior might express; accordingly, the govern-
ment’s interest in prohibiting the burning of them is (once more) “unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression.”25 The government’s interest in banning the 
burning of American flags, however, is not. “[P]reserving the flag as a symbol 
of nationhood and national unity” necessarily involves favoring one set of mes-
sages over another.26 Nor can “preventing breaches of the peace” be viewed as 
a justification independent of hostility toward a disfavored message if the only 
cause for such disorder is the “serious offense” onlookers would take toward 
the burning of the flag.27 
The government’s interest in protecting individuals from “distinct emo-
tional harms” and in averting retaliatory cycles of violence supplies “an ade-
quate explanation” for hate crime laws “over and above mere disagreement 
with offenders’ beliefs or biases,”28 the Court has reasoned. Likewise, protect-
ing individuals from fear of physical attack is a constitutionally sound basis for 
prohibiting dramatic gestures, such as cross burnings, intended to intimidate.29 
Nevertheless, if the selectivity with which the government prohibits such as-
saultive behavior reflects a “special hostility towards the particular biases thus 
singled out,” punishment of such conduct reflects exactly the sort of disapprov-
al of ideas that the First Amendment is meant to proscribe.30 
In addition to systematizing a diverse body of cases, the teleological con-
ception of the speech-conduct distinction also integrates First Amendment doc-
trine into a more general theory of constitutional liberty. The prohibition on 
state endorsement of a partisan conception of the good life—the core tenet of 
liberal neutrality31—is reflected in the First Amendment injunction that “no of-
ficial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”32 The principle of “liberal public 
 
 25. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 26. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407; see also Eichman, 496 U.S. at 316-17 (stating that pro-
tection of the meaning of the flag as a symbol of national unity cannot be understood without 
reference to interest in regulating the ideas associated with various uses of the flag). 
 27. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407-08. 
 28. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993). 
 29. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003).  
 30. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992). 
 31. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 63-64 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). 
 32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see DWORKIN, 
supra note 6, at 237-38 (writing that the First Amendment reflects the liberal principle that 
“no one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral environment, through his own 
private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust 
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reason,” which requires that law be justified by its contribution to attainment of 
secular goods of value to citizens of diverse cultural and moral outlooks,33 is 
advanced when courts scrutinize the asserted basis of regulations to assure that 
they advance interests “unrelated to suppression” of disfavored ideas.34 Deci-
sions construing equal protection35 and due process36 to forbid imposition of 
other types of legal disabilities solely to promote favored moral and religious 
norms can be read in like fashion.37 Distinguishing “speech” from “conduct,” 
then, can be seen as characteristic of the type of judgments courts must make to 
perfect the liberal underpinnings of the American constitutional regime.38 
 
those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up”); Note, A Communitarian Defense 
of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 688 (1988) (arguing that the First Amendment 
implements a bar on state endorsement of the good by treating “aversion that some persons 
feel toward the life choices of others” as a noncognizable harm). 
 33. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 175, 217-18 (expanded ed. 1993) (articu-
lating the norm of “public reason” that prohibits political actors in most contexts from invok-
ing “comprehensive views” that “include[] conceptions of what is of value in human life, as 
well as ideals of personal virtue and character” and instead requires them to “explain . . . 
how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by” considera-
tions consistent with “a diversity of reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines”); see 
also David A. Strauss, Legal Argument and the Overlapping Consensus 20-21 (July 12, 
1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that conventional modes of 
legal reasoning and justification reflect a liberal public-reason norm). 
 34. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 9, at 453-54 (explaining that “the strict scrutiny stand-
ard . . . is best understood as an evidentiary device” to furnish “assurance that the govern-
ment has acted for proper reasons” and that the interest asserted is not a pretext for “antipa-
thy toward the speech affected” by regulation). 
 35. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (“[I]f the constitutional concep-
tion of equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. 
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).  
 36. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 567-71 (2003) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause forbids the “majority [to] use the power of the State to enforce . . . on the 
whole society” standards of private conduct that originate in “religious beliefs, conceptions 
of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family”). 
 37. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 110-12 (arguing that the right of individ-
uals “to confront for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions, the 
most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their own lives” inheres in 
“the structure of the Constitution” as well as in various textual provisions of it); RICHARDS, 
supra note 6 (using liberal theory to explicate constitutional guarantees of free speech, free-
dom of religion, equality, and privacy); Dworkin, supra note 31, at 70 (asserting that “the 
rights encoded in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, as interpreted (on the 
whole) by the Supreme Court, are those that a substantial number of liberals would think 
reasonably well suited to what the United States now requires”). 
 38. Cf. Kagan, supra note 9, at 511 (suggesting that the First Amendment prohibition 
on making aversion to ideas a basis for regulating reflects the “principle that the government 
must treat all persons with equal respect and concern” and that the same principle “may well 
explain much of equal protection law”). 
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B. Culturally Motivated Reasoning 
“Cultural cognition” is a species of motivated reasoning that promotes 
congruence between a person’s defining group commitments, on the one hand, 
and his or her perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.39 A variety of 
mechanisms contribute to this effect. Thus, individuals tend selectively to credit 
empirical information in patterns congenial to their cultural values.40 They are 
also disposed to impute knowledge and expertise to others with whom they 
share a cultural affinity.41 And they are more likely to note, assign significance 
to, and recall facts supportive of their cultural outlooks than facts subversive of 
them.42 These dynamics protect individuals’ connection to others on whom 
they depend for material and emotional support.43 
At a societal level, however, culturally motivated cognition can be a source 
of intense and enduring political conflict.44 Citizens who subscribe to an egali-
tarian ethic that identifies free markets as fonts of unjust disparity readily credit 
evidence that commerce and industry are destroying the environment; citizens 
who adhere to an individualistic ethic that prizes private orderings dismiss such 
evidence and insist instead that needless government regulation threatens to 
wreck economic prosperity.45 Associating firearms with patriarchy, racism, and 
distrust, egalitarian and communitarian citizens blame accidental shootings and 
crime on insufficient regulation of guns; hierarchical and individualist citizens, 
in contrast, worry that too much regulation will render law-abiding citizens 
vulnerable to predation, a belief congenial to the value they attach to guns as 
instruments of social roles (father, protector) and symbols of virtues (self-
 
 39. For this reason, we refer interchangeably to “cultural cognition” and “culturally 
motivated cognition” or “culturally motivated reasoning.” See generally Kahan, Neutral 
Principles, supra note 5, at 19-26. 
 40. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey 
Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 87 (2009). 
 41. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul 
Slovic, Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the 
Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 504 (2010). 
 42. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural 
Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147 (2011).  
 43. See generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Psychology of Self-
Defense: Self-Affirmation Theory, 38 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2006). 
 44. See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296 
(2010). 
 45. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON 
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 177-79 (1982); Karl Dake, 
Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews 
and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 78 (1991); Dan M. Kahan & 
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 158 
(2006). 
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reliance, honor) distinctive of their ways of life.46 Citizens who combine hier-
archical and communitarian values believe that the right to abortion demeans 
those women who eschew the workplace to be mothers; correspondingly, they 
worry that abortion poses a health risk to women.47 Citizens who combine 
egalitarian and individualist values, and who assign status to women as well as 
men for professional and commercial success, believe that restrictions on abor-
tion put women’s health in danger.48 Myriad other issues—from the risks and 
benefits of the HPV vaccine for schoolgirls49 to the efficacy of legally mandat-
ed medical treatment for (noninstitutionalized) mentally ill persons50—divide 
citizens along lines that correspond to the social meanings these policies con-
note within opposing ways of life.51 
Conflicts of this sort expose democratic pluralism to a distinctive threat: 
cognitive illiberalism. Because their perceptions of risk and related facts are 
unconsciously motivated by their defining commitments, even citizens who are 
genuinely committed to principles of liberal neutrality are likely to end up per-
sistently divided along cultural lines—not over the proper ends of law (physical 
security, economic prosperity, public health, and the like) but over the means 
for securing them.52 Nor is the cultural complexion of these seemingly empiri-
cal disputes likely to evade notice by those involved in them. On the contrary, 
consistent with a dynamic known as “naive realism,” each side in these con-
flicts is likely to suspect the other (realistically), but not itself (naively), of fit-
ting its empirical beliefs about how the world works to its moral vision of how 
it should.53 Citizens defeated in political conflicts of this sort will thus face the 
same form of humiliation they would suffer had their worldviews been explicit-
ly denigrated by culturally partisan laws. To avoid this experience, groups pre-
dictably mobilize and energize their members by advocating positions that ex-
 
 46. Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Culture 
and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 474, 485-88 (2007).  
 47. See id. at 475-76, 489-91. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Kahan et al., supra note 41. 
 50. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Monahan, Lisa Callahan & Ellen Peters, 
Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws, 34 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 118 (2010). 
 51. See Roberto Gutierrez & Roger Giner-Sorolla, Anger, Disgust, and Presumption of 
Harm as Reactions to Taboo-Breaking Behaviors, 7 EMOTION 853, 853-54 (2007) (finding 
that individuals are motivated to impute harm to intrinsically immoral behavior); Jonathan 
Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives 
and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 212-13 (2001) (same). 
 52. See John Gastil, Don Braman, Dan Kahan & Paul Slovic, The Cultural Orientation 
of Mass Political Opinion, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 711 (2011); Kahan, supra note 7, at 118-
42. 
 53. See generally Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in 
Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 404 (1995). 
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pressively affirm their own partisan values—thereby provoking reciprocal anx-
iety and resistance by their adversaries, who can be expected in turn to resort to 
status-protective symbolic political action.54 
C. Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction 
There is an obvious tension between the phenomenon of culturally moti-
vated cognition and the teleological conception of the speech-conduct distinc-
tion. Delimiting the scope of the First Amendment requires legal 
decisionmakers to determine whether a regulation (in general, and as applied in 
particular instances) is justified by a governmental purpose independent of 
aversion to any idea expressed by regulated acts. Such an assessment involves 
factual judgments akin to the empirical assessments that lawmakers and citi-
zens make in considering the utilitarian efficacy of policies and laws: Is there a 
basis for believing the regulated behavior is causing the asserted harm? Are the 
magnitude of the harm and the effect of the regulation in abating it sufficiently 
large in relation to the cost of the regulation? Is indifference to behaviors that 
cause like harms grounds to suspect the genuineness of the regulators’ pro-
fessed motivations? In making these sorts of determinations, legal 
decisionmakers are thus likely to experience the same type of identity-
protective pressure that influences them to form culturally congenial percep-
tions of risk and other policy-consequential facts. 
The potential impact of culturally motivated cognition on facts pertinent to 
the speech-conduct distinction, however, is arguably even more troubling than 
its impact on perceptions of policy-consequential facts. The vulnerability of 
democratic policy making to antiliberal impulses is familiar. It is precisely be-
cause we anticipate that democratically accountable officials will sometimes 
indulge the temptation to make law an instrument of cultural orthodoxy that we 
envision the Constitution, enforced by an independent system of adjudication, 
as integral to realization of liberal political principles in law. Indeed, the idea 
that democratically accountable actors might sometimes unwittingly succumb 
to partisan temptation is itself contemplated by the practice of judicial “strict 
scrutiny,” which probes the proffered justification of laws that incidentally 
abridge constitutional liberties to “flush out” unconscious illicit intentions as 
well as deliberately concealed ones.55 However, this critical checking function 
would be subverted if factfinding and other elements of constitutional review 
were themselves subject to unwitting corruption by cognitive illiberalism.  
Is this a psychologically realistic concern? Cultural cognition has already 
been shown to exert an impact on perceptions of legally consequential facts 
very similar to the one it exerts on perceptions of risk. Issues such as “consent” 
 
 54. See Kahan, supra note 7, at 148-51. See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC 
CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986). 
 55. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 9, at 431 n.55, 453-55, 500-01. 
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in acquaintance rape cases,56 the risks posed by fleeing suspects against whom 
the police use deadly force,57 and the feasibility of nonlethal alternatives when 
battered women and other controversial offenders resort to homicidal violence 
in self-defense58 are ripe with social meanings. Studies show that citizens of 
diverse cultural outlooks divide along predictable lines when assessing such 
facts. This evidence furnishes reason to worry that factfinding essential to con-
stitutional law will be similarly pervaded by culturally motivated cognition.59 
But conjecture and storytelling, as suggestive of hypotheses as they might 
be, are not a substitute for proof.60 The most reliable way to examine the poten-
tial impact of culturally motivated cognition on the speech-conduct distinction 
is to conduct an empirical study of the possibility. 
II. STUDY 
A. Overview and Hypotheses 
We conducted a study to test the hypothesis that culturally motivated cog-
nition will distort perception of the line between speech and conduct. The study 
focused on the lawfulness of police action to halt a political demonstration for 
allegedly obstructing, threatening, or intimidating members of the public. In 
broad outlines, this is a recurring scenario across diverse settings, from antiwar 
rallies, to pro- and anti-civil rights marches, to the picketing of commercial es-
tablishments, courthouses, foreign embassies, and abortion clinics. 
First Amendment jurisprudence here reflects the teleological conception of 
the speech-conduct distinction. The state’s obligation to permit expression of 
unpopular views rules out the enforcement of any governmental interest that is 
related to the communicative content of protest activity, such as protecting tar-
gets of criticism from suffering the indignity of “public odium,”61 shielding 
parties from the “inconvenience” or “annoyance” of having to avoid disagreea-
 
 56. See Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent, supra note 5.  
 57. See Kahan et al., supra note 5. 
 58. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 5. 
 59. Sood & Darley, supra note 5, report that individuals are likely to impute “harm” to 
behavior they find offensive when told that only “harmful” behavior can be criminalized, a 
finding, they recognize, with implications for constitutional law. Our study complements 
theirs both by connecting motivated reasoning to the specific facts relevant to distinguishing 
permissible regulations of conduct from impermissible regulations of speech, and by exam-
ining how motivated cognition interacts with diverse systems of values, the distinctive focus 
of cultural cognition. 
 60. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Po-
litical—of “Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (2010); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Comment, Is Evolutionary Analysis of Law Science or Storytelling?, 41 
JURIMETRICS J. 365 (2001). 
 61. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 320-21 (1988). 
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ble ideas,62 or forestalling unrest caused by onlookers’ aversion to the message 
protectors are conveying.63 “[T]he right to attempt to persuade others to change 
their views . . . may not be curtailed simply because the speaker’s message may 
be offensive to his audience.”64 Indeed, because “a function of free speech un-
der our system of government is to invite dispute,” it is to be expected that it 
will sometimes “induce[] a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stir[] people to anger.”65 Nevertheless, the po-
lice needn’t stand idly by “when . . . the speaker passes the bounds of argument 
or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.”66 Nor does the First Amend-
ment prevent the police from intervening to stop demonstrators from engaging 
in assaultive behavior such as “jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving” or 
from intimidating others through “‘in your face’ yelling.”67 Discharging the 
“responsibility to keep [the] streets open and available for movement” and to 
assure passersby “entrance to a public or private building” also justifies police 
action to terminate a political demonstration.68 Yet in all cases, it is necessary 
to scrutinize the facts to assure that the assertion of the “interest of the commu-
nity in maintaining peace and order on its streets”69 is not used to disguise cen-
sorial motives on the part of either the authorities or the public.70  
In our study, subjects were instructed to imagine they were jurors in a case 
that turned on whether a group of protestors had crossed the speech-conduct 
line, so conceived. The subjects indicated their findings on key facts after view-
ing a videotape of a political demonstration that we told them was halted by the 
police. The use of a video was designed to enhance the realism of the design. 
Cases challenging the use of police authority to halt allegedly violent, intimi-
dating, or disorderly demonstrations often feature videotapes of the demonstra-
 
 62. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 63. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (“The State’s position, there-
fore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is 
necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this ba-
sis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption.” (footnote omitted)); Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (finding “[t]he fear of violence . . . based upon the reac-
tion of” angry onlookers insufficient to justify breaking up a civil rights demonstration). 
 64. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000). 
 65. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
 66. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). 
 67. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 363 (1997). 
 68. Cox, 379 U.S. at 555. 
 69. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320. 
 70. See, e.g., Cox, 379 U.S. at 546 (“The State argues . . . that while the demonstrators 
started out to be orderly, . . . [their behavior thereafter] converted the peaceful assembly into 
a riotous one. The record, however, does not support this assertion.” (footnote omitted)); 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“The state courts have held that the 
petitioners’ conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law, and we may accept their 
decision as binding upon us to that extent. But it nevertheless remains our duty in a case such 
as this to make an independent examination of the whole record.”). 
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tors’ behavior.71 When such cases are reviewed by appellate courts, moreover, 
judges sometimes disagree with each other about whether the video depicts 
protected speech or regulable conduct.72 
To sharpen exploration of how values affect such perceptions, our study 
involved an experimental manipulation. Half of the subjects were advised that 
the filmed demonstration occurred outside an abortion clinic and was aimed at 
protesting legalized abortion (“abortion clinic condition”); the other half were 
told the demonstration occurred outside of a college career-placement facility 
during interviews by the military and was aimed at protesting the armed forces’ 
then-existing ban on service by openly gay and lesbian soldiers (“recruitment 
center condition”).73 In both conditions, subjects were advised that the protes-
tors were suing the police for ordering the protestors to disperse on the basis of 
an ordinance prohibiting “obstructing,” “intimidating,” and “threatening” per-
sons seeking to use the facilities in question. Protests of this character are real-
istic. They also feature values that can be expected to maximize opposing 
forms of culturally motivated cognition. The design thus permitted us to exam-
ine, first, whether subjects with opposing cultural worldviews would form dif-
ferent fact perceptions when they were assigned to the same experimental con-
dition (that is, when they had the same beliefs about the cause of the 
demonstrators); and second, whether subjects assigned to one condition would 
form fact perceptions at odds with those of subjects who shared their 
worldview but who were assigned to the other condition (that is, who had a dif-
ferent belief about the cause of the protestors). 
To measure the subjects’ worldviews, we employed scales used in previous 
studies of cultural cognition.74 These scales characterize worldviews along two 
orthogonal dimensions. The first, hierarchy-egalitarianism, measures the sub-
jects’ orientations toward social orderings that either feature or eschew strati-
 
 71. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (abortion clinic protest); Cox, 
379 U.S. at 547 (civil rights protest); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(tax protest); United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996) (abortion clinic 
protest). 
 72. Compare, e.g., Cannon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 
1993) (reversing grant of summary judgment against abortion clinic protestors suing police 
for breach-of-peace arrest, stating that “[w]e find in the instant case no assault or threatening 
of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse,” but ra-
ther “only an effort to persuade a willing listener”), with id. at 880 (Anderson, J., concurring) 
(“Frankly, in my view if the plaintiffs’ evidence at the end of a trial remained as it now 
stands, the trial judge would be entitled to grant a defense motion . . . for judgment as a mat-
ter of law. Thus, technically, the record before us now could support the grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant City.”). 
 73. The study was conducted in November 2010, before congressional repeal of the 
military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. 
 74. See Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of 
Risk, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGY, DECISION THEORY, ETHICS, AND 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISK 725 (Sabine Roeser et al. eds., 2012).  
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fied roles and forms of authority. The second, individualism-
communitarianism, measures their orientations toward orderings that empha-
size individual autonomy and self-sufficiency, on the one hand, and those that 
emphasize collective responsibilities and prerogatives, on the other. Combining 
the two scales generates four sets of worldviews: hierarchical individualism 
(HI), hierarchical communitarianism (HC), egalitarian individualism (EI), and 
egalitarian communitarianism (EC), to which individuals’ affinities can be 
measured with continuous worldview scores.75 
Based on the nature of these cultural predispositions and on previous re-
search, we formed a set of discrete hypotheses. We enumerate them and assign 
each a descriptive label to facilitate exposition. 
Based on their predispositions, subjects with opposing cultural values were 
expected to disagree with each other within each experimental condition, while 
those with the same values were expected to disagree with one another between 
experimental conditions. The EI/HC polarization hypothesis predicted that 
egalitarian individualists and hierarchical communitarians would form diamet-
rically opposed perceptions in both conditions. The EC/HI semipolarization 
hypothesis predicted that egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individu-
alists would polarize most intensely in the military recruitment center condi-
tion. 
1. EI inversion  
Relatively egalitarian individualist subjects, we surmised, would form anti-
demonstrator fact perceptions in the abortion clinic condition but pro-
demonstrator perceptions in the recruitment center condition. Egalitarian indi-
vidualists are morally opposed both to social stratification, such as that associ-
ated with traditional gender roles, and to institutional rankings, such as those 
that pervade the military.76 Accordingly, we anticipated that egalitarian indi-
 
 75. Membership in the Democratic or Republican Party and possession of “liberal” or 
“conservative” political views are likely to generate motivated cognition too. See, e.g., Geof-
frey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political 
Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). We chose to use the cultural-
cognition worldview scales instead for several reasons. One is that the study hypotheses con-
templated divisions simultaneously along two dimensions, effects that could not be captured 
by one-dimensional party-affiliation or ideology scales. In addition, previous research has 
established that the cultural worldview scales have greater predictive power for individuals 
of low to moderate political sophistication, see Gastil et al., supra note 52, at 712-13, many 
of whom identify themselves as unaffiliated with either major party and disclaim either a 
liberal or conservative orientation. Finally, use of the cultural-cognition scales facilitated 
continuity between the present study and numerous others examining the contribution the 
specified worldviews make to political conflict over policy and legally relevant facts. 
 76. See, e.g., Gastil et al., supra note 52, at 713 (finding that egalitarian individualism 
predicts pro-gay rights and antimilitary policy preferences); Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 
480 (noting egalitarian individualist predisposition to form fact perceptions supportive of 
egalitarian gender norms).  
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vidualists would likely be hostile to protestors in the abortion clinic condition 
and sympathetic to those in the recruitment center condition. We also expected 
that egalitarian individualist subjects would feel their worldviews were being 
affirmed and threatened, respectively, by the abortion clinic and military re-
cruitment center “free access” ordinances. We therefore predicted these sub-
jects would be inclined to perceive that the protestors had engaged in prohibited 
conduct in the abortion clinic condition but protected speech in the recruitment 
center condition. 
2. HC inversion 
We predicted that relatively hierarchical and communitarian subjects, by 
contrast, would form pro-demonstrator fact perceptions in the abortion clinic 
condition but anti-demonstrator perceptions in the recruitment center condition. 
Hierarchical communitarians are strongly supportive of traditional gender 
norms, and as a result attach a negative social meaning to abortion rights, 
which to them denigrate the status properly afforded women for successful 
mastery of female domestic roles centering on maternity.77 We anticipated that 
they would therefore find the ordinance securing free access to abortion clinics 
particularly repugnant. In contrast, they attach positive meanings to the military 
as an institution that is characterized by stratified internal orderings that subor-
dinate the individual to the collective, and as a setting in which men, in particu-
lar, can occupy roles that display the virtue of patriotism.78 These resonances, 
we predicted, would create identity-protective pressure on hierarchical commu-
nitarian subjects to perceive the antiabortion demonstrators engaged in protect-
ed speech and the antimilitary demonstrators engaged in obstruction, intimida-
tion, and similar prohibited “conduct.” 
3. HI bias 
We anticipated that subjects holding relatively hierarchical and individual-
istic values would form strong anti-demonstrator fact perceptions in the re-
cruitment center condition, but more muted anti-demonstrator perceptions in 
the abortion clinic condition. Virtues such as courage, honor, and martial prow-
ess figure conspicuously in this way of life and are status-conferring for men in 
particular.79 We expected, then, that hierarchical individualists would be moral-
ly hostile to the aims of the protestors in the recruitment center condition, and 
 
 77. See Dake, supra note 45, at 72 (finding that hierarchy is associated with the per-
ception that social deviance generates harm); Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 475, 489-90 
(noting hierarchical communitarian predisposition to form fact perceptions supportive of hi-
erarchical gender norms). 
 78. See Gastil et al., supra note 52, at 713 (finding hierarchical communitarian dispo-
sition to be associated with pro-military policy preferences). 
 79. See Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 474. 
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hence form fact perceptions consistent with the finding that they engaged in 
prohibited conduct rather than protected speech. We anticipated that hierar-
chical individualists would be unlikely to take offense at the message of the an-
tiabortion protestors. Nevertheless, abortion rights do not bear a meaning nearly 
as threatening to hierarchical individualists as they do to hierarchical communi-
tarians; in addition, hierarchical individualists tend to place a high value on so-
cial order generally.80 We anticipated, then, that hierarchical individualists 
would form less strong pro-demonstrator perceptions in the abortion clinic con-
dition than would hierarchical communitarians. 
4. EC bias 
We hypothesized that relatively egalitarian communitarian subjects would 
form strong pro-demonstrator fact perceptions in the recruitment center condi-
tion and modestly anti-demonstrator fact perceptions in the abortion clinic con-
dition. Egalitarian communitarians see the imposition of legal disabilities on 
gays and lesbians as a symbol of institutionalized patriarchy. They strongly 
support gay marriage and gay parenting, the social meanings of which enable 
alternative, nonpatriarchal forms of community and shared commitment.81 We 
anticipated that similar sensibilities would make them supportive of lifting re-
strictions on military service by openly gay and lesbian citizens, and hence 
trigger culturally motivated cognition supportive of the recruitment center pro-
testors. We also expected that egalitarian communitarians would be offended 
by the anti-gender equality resonances of the abortion clinic protestors. Never-
theless, abortion rights also bear individualistic meanings that egalitarian com-
munitarians resist.82 Accordingly, we anticipated that egalitarian communica-
tions in the abortion clinic condition would feel less impelled than egalitarian 
individualists in that condition to perceive the demonstrators as engaged in 
prohibited conduct rather than protected speech. 
5. EI/HC polarization 
The final two hypotheses relate to the expected intensity and character of 
the disagreement between subjects of opposing cultural identities. We hypothe-
sized that in both conditions there would be strong, mirror-image forms of po-
larization between relatively egalitarian and individualistic subjects, on the one 
 
 80. See id. at 469, 480-81. 
 81. See THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, THE CULTURAL COGNITION OF GAY AND 
LESBIAN PARENTING: SUMMARY OF FIRST ROUND DATA COLLECTION 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/browse-papers/first-report-on-gay-and-lesbian-parenting 
.html. 
 82. See Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 489-90 (finding egalitarian communitarians to 
be ambivalent on harm from abortion). 
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hand, and relatively hierarchical communitarian ones, on the other. This predic-
tion was simply a logical implication of the EI and HC inversion hypotheses. 
6. EC/HI semipolarization 
Consistent with the HI and EC bias hypotheses, we predicted that disa-
greement between egalitarian and communitarian subjects, on the one hand, 
and hierarchical and individualistic ones, on the other, would be less symmet-
ric. We expected the two to be strongly polarized in the recruitment center con-
dition, in which the cultural meaning of the protestors’ cause would exert dia-
metrically opposing forces on their respective perceptions. However, because 
abortion rights bear more equivocal meanings within the worldviews of both of 
these groups, we anticipated that their disagreement in the abortion clinic con-
dition would likely be more moderate. 
FIGURE 1 













Based on their predispositions, subjects with opposing cultural values were expected to disa-
gree with each other within each experimental condition, while those with the same values 
were expected to disagree with one another between experimental conditions. The EI/HC 
polarization hypothesis predicted that egalitarian individualists and hierarchical communitar-
ians would form diametrically opposed perceptions in both conditions. The EC/HI 
semipolarization hypothesis predicted that egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical indi-
vidualists would polarize most intensely in the military recruitment center condition. 
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B. Design and Methods 
1. Sample 
The subjects for the study consisted of 202 American adults. They were se-
lected randomly from a stratified national sample by Polimetrix, Inc.,83 and 
participated in the study through Polimetrix’s online testing facilities. Forty-six 
percent of the sample were female. Seventy-two percent were white, and nine 
percent African American. The median level of education was between “some” 
college and “two years” of college. The median annual income was between 
$40,000 and $49,999. The average age was forty-six. 
2. Cultural worldviews 
Subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured in advance of the study with 
the hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism scales used 
in previous studies of cultural cognition.84 The scales consisted of twelve 
statements expressing attitudes characteristic of one or the other worldview di-
mension (e.g., “Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine”; “The 
government interferes far too much in our everyday lives”), and subjects indi-
cated agreement or disagreement on a six-point scale. Each six-item scale was 
highly reliable,85 and the twelve items loaded appropriately on two separate 
factors, Hierarchy and Individualism, which were used as continuous predictors 
 
 83. Polimetrix is a public opinion research firm that conducts online surveys and ex-
periments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and commercial customers 
(including political campaigns). It maintains a panel of over one million Americans that it 
uses to construct representative study samples. For more information, see DOUGLAS RIVERS, 
SAMPLING FOR WEB SURVEYS (2007), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/yg-public/    
Scientific/Sample+Matching_JSM.pdf. 
 84. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 42, at 151. For a full discussion of the complete 
and short-form versions of the scales and of their psychometric properties, see Kahan, supra 
note 74. 
 85. The factor Hierarchy had a Cronbach’s α of 0.87, while the factor Individualism 
had a Cronbach’s α of 0.81. Cronbach’s α is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of 
attitudinal scales. By computing the degree of intercorrelation that exists among various 
items within a scale, it can be used to assess whether the items can properly be treated as 
common indicators of a latent attitude or trait (i.e., one that cannot be directly observed and 
measured). See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of 
Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98 (1993). Composite scales of this sort 
are desirable not only because they facilitate measurement of unobservable dispositions but 
also because the measurements they enable are necessarily more precise than ones based on 
any of the individual indicators alone, each of which can be seen as an imperfect or “noisy” 
approximation of the phenomenon being studied. See generally J. Philippe Rushton et al., 
Behavioral Development and Construct Validity: The Principle of Aggregation, 94 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 18 (1983). Generally, α ≥ .70 suggests scale validity (i.e., that the measures when ag-
gregated furnish a reliable measure of the latent trait or attitude). See Cortina, supra, at 101. 
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for multivariate testing of the study hypotheses.86 In addition, to enable illustra-
tive analyses, we designated each subject as either a “hierarchical individual-
ist,” a “hierarchical communitarian,” an “egalitarian individualist,” or an 
“egalitarian communitarian” based on his or her scores in relation to the sample 
medians on each scale. 
3.  Stimulus 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the abortion clinic condition or 
the recruitment center condition. They were then assigned to read a vignette 
and view an accompanying video.87 
a. Vignette 
The vignette described the background of a lawsuit by political protestors 
against individual police officers and the police department. Depending on the 
condition, the protestors were described either as “members of a group that op-
poses permitting doctors and nurses to perform abortions at the request of preg-
nant women” or as “members of a group that opposes the ban on allowing 
openly gay and lesbian citizens to join the military.” The protestors’ complaint, 
the vignette stated, alleged that the police had “violated their rights by ordering 
them to end their protest at” either “an abortion clinic” or “a college campus 
recruitment center on the day the Army was scheduled to interview students 
who were considering enlisting.”  
Subjects were told that the defendants claimed halting the protest was justi-
fied by a law entitled the “Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law,” in 
one condition, or the “Freedom to Serve with Honor Law,” in the other. The 
law, enacted after a previous judicial ruling found that police lacked “clear 
guidelines” for halting such protests, made it illegal for “any person to inten-
tionally (1) interfere with, (2) obstruct, (3) intimidate, or (4) threaten any per-
son who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on premises of” either 
“any hospital or medical clinic that is licensed to perform abortions” or “any 
facility in which the U.S. military is engaged in recruitment activity.” This text 
was patterned on the Federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
 
 86. Treating Hierarchy and Individualism as continuous predictors maximizes statisti-
cal power and avoids the bias that can be introduced by splitting them at the mean or other 
selected points in order to transform them into discrete, categorical measures. See JAMES 
JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION 86 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 87. The study instrument, including the vignette and response instruments, is repro-
duced in Appendix A. The videos can be viewed online. See videoreview12, Abortion Clinic 
11 22 2010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ru-FE2v_8; 
videoreview12, Recruit_Center_11192010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=X3PJACpL53k.  
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(FACE),88 enacted in response to demonstration activity perceived to be in-
tended to impede operation of abortion facilities, and the Freedom to Serve Act 
of 2008 bill,89 which would have created a similar provision relating to military 
recruitment facilities.90 Each version also authorized officers to order protestors 
to cease and leave the vicinity upon “observ[ing] or [being] furnished with reli-
able evidence” that the law was being violated. The protestors, according to the 
vignette, alleged that they had been “only expressing their views, in a manner 
that did not violate the law.”  
Subjects were advised that both parties agreed that a “video of the protest” 
furnished an “accurate impression of the nature of the protestors’ conduct” and 
thus represented “the key evidence” in the case. However, the parties were de-
scribed as  
disagree[ing] about whose position the video most supports: the position of 
the police officers, who assert that the protestors were “intimidating, interfer-
ing, obstructing or threatening” people trying to enter the abortion clinic cam-
pus recruitment center; or the position of the protestors, who say they were 
merely expressing their views in a lawful manner. 
“Deciding who is right is the task for you as a member of the jury,” the vi-
gnette stated. Subjects were then instructed to view the video. 
 
 88. Section 248 of the Act provides: 
(a) Prohibited Activities.—Whoever—  
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intim-
idates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person be-
cause that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person 
or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services [is sub-
ject to criminal and civil penalties]. 
18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2006). 
89.  The Freedom to Serve Act of 2008 bill read: 
(a) Whoever— 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, injures, intimidates or inter-
feres with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person 
is or has been providing Federal or State military recruiting service.  
H.R. 6023, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), all nine Justices, including three dissent-
ers who would have invalidated the statute on other grounds, endorsed the constitutionality 
of language similar to that in our vignettes. See id. at 707-08, 735 (describing the statute in 
question and finding it valid); id. at 754-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the portion 
of the law that subjects to liability “any person who ‘knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, 
impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or exit from a health care facility’” is “narrowly 
tailored to serve” the state’s asserted interest in securing access to such a facility and would 
not have been reinforced with additional provisions had the state not also been interested in 
stifling abortion clinic protestors in particular); id. at 777 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same). 
Lower courts have rejected constitutional challenges to FACE. See, e.g., United States v. 
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1375 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To persuade and to blockade are importantly 
different forms of action.”). 
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b. Video 
Approximately three and one-half minutes in length, the video depicts an 
actual political demonstration that occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 
March 2009. The protestors included approximately half a dozen members of 
the Westboro Baptist Church, a Kansas-based group whose members conduct 
demonstrations condemning homosexuality.91 Also present were approximately 
two hundred counter-demonstrators, although the video was designed to create 
the impression that they and the church members formed a single mass of pro-
testors. The video consists of five distinct scenes showing both the Westboro 
Baptist Church members and the counter-demonstrators congregated near the 
entrance of a building. The video also contains numerous shots of helmeted po-
lice officers who were present to direct traffic and control the crowd in the vi-
cinity of the protest. In certain scenes, pedestrians (all college-aged males and 
females) are shown either veering away from the protestors gathered near the 
entrance of the building or walking in the opposite direction of the entrance 
while looking over their shoulders at the crowd. 
A screen of explanatory text appears before each scene.92 Described as 
“based on witness statements the parties agree are accurate,” the text relates 
what the next scene will show in a deliberately bland manner meant to avoid 
expressing a position on any disputed issue (e.g., “Outside [the reproductive 
health clinic/campus recruitment center] 15 minutes before it was scheduled to 
open”). The text indicates that the pedestrians—described as either clinic “pa-
tients” and “staff” or “students” scheduled for interviews—did not enter the fa-
cility but did not state a reason. (“Scene at the entrance of [clinic/campus re-
cruitment center]. [Patient/student] approaches but does not enter.”) In two 
scenes, the text identifies a middle-aged man conversing with a police officer 
as the “director” of either the “clinic” or “recruitment center” and describes him 





 91. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). The Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri in Phelps approximately one year after the Cambridge demonstration featured in the study 
videotape. At issue in Phelps was an award of damages against the Westboro Baptist Church 
members for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 1214. The basis of the 
award was a protest that the group conducted at the funeral of a soldier, whose death, the 
group asserted, was an act of retaliation by God for the United States’ tolerance of homosex-
uality. See id. at 1213. Applying the teleological conception of speech, the Court held that 
the award of damages to the soldier’s father violated the First Amendment. See id. at 1218-
20 (noting that “any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned o n the content and 
viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself,” and 
suggesting that the state would be free to prohibit protest behavior that was “unruly” or 
“violen[t],” or that “interfere[d] with the funeral itself”).  
 92. See infra Figure 3. 
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Subjects in each condition viewed a video of a political demonstration. Wording of the signs 
was blurred to prevent identification of the actual subject matter of the protest. Subjects were 
instructed that the court had ordered the blurring to prevent jurors from being influenced by 
the messages they contained. 
 
 
The film was also altered to prevent subjects from identifying the actual 
positions of either the Westboro Baptist Church members or the counter-
demonstrators. The words printed on the groups’ respective signs were blurred; 
subjects were instructed that the court had ordered the blurring to “assure that 
th[e] messages did not affect the jury one way or the other” because “the U.S. 
Constitution prohibits the police from breaking up a protest based on the mes-
sages the protestors are trying to communicate.” In addition, generic crowd 
noise, consisting primarily of a cacophony of shouts and chants, was added as a 
sound track. 
A pretest conducted on a group of approximately one hundred judges and 
lawyers confirmed that the tape could be plausibly identified as either an abor-
tion clinic or recruitment center protest. None of the participants in the pretest 
recognized the protestors. Debriefing feedback for the study suggested that on-
ly one subject identified the protestors as members of the Westboro Baptist 
Church. That subject’s responses were therefore excluded from analysis. 
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 The intent of both the filming and editing was to create grounds for oppos-
ing conclusions about the key facts. At no point in the film is there physical 
contact between the protestors or counter-demonstrators and the pedestrians 
identified as not entering the facility. Nevertheless, the proximity of the protes-
tors to the pedestrians and to the entrance would have furnished a basis for in-
ferring that the protestors either obstructed or intimidated the pedestrians. So 
would the passionate behavior of the demonstrators, including in particular one 
female protestor who is shown at various points yelling and appearing to ges-
ture in the direction of those intent on entering the facility. Yet it could also 
have been inferred that pedestrians avoided entering either because they were 
persuaded by the protestors’ message, were averse to being obliged to listen to 
the protestors, or were anxious not to be publicly condemned for their behavior. 
Members of the lawyer-judge pretest panel were close to evenly divided on the-
se matters and thus on whether the police had cause for ordering a cessation of 
the protest.93 
FIGURE 3 


















Each of the five scenes in the video was introduced by a text screen. The text screens con-




 93. In reality, the police did not halt the protest, which terminated without incident af-
ter approximately forty-five minutes.  
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4. Response measures 
After watching the video, subjects were asked to indicate on a six-point 
scale their level of disagreement or agreement with twenty-one response items. 
The first seventeen items related to various facts relevant to application of the 
standard set forth in the Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law and the 
Freedom to Serve with Honor Law. Some of the items indicated that the police 
acted on grounds that would justify treating the protest activity as prohibited 
“conduct” under prevailing First Amendment doctrine (e.g., “The protestors 
obstructed individuals seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on the premises 
of the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]”; “There was a risk that the 
protestors might resort to violence if anyone tried to enter”).94 Others, in con-
trast, suggested the protestors were engaged in lawful speech and that the moti-
vation for ordering a halt to the demonstration was speech-related and hence 
impermissible (e.g., “The protestors intended only to persuade people not to go 
into the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center], not to physically interfere 
with, intimidate, obstruct, or threaten anybody”; “It is more likely the director 
asked the police to break up the protest because the director and others found 
dealing with the protestors annoying than because the protestors were interfer-
ing with, intimidating, obstructing, or threatening anyone”).95 Some items at-
tributed actions to the protestors’ behavior that clearly did not occur—that they 
“shoved” prospective facility users and “spit” at them, for example—but most 
of the facts were matters of interpretation and inference. 
The last four items related to the proper disposition of the case. These in-
cluded the appropriateness of an award of damages and entry of an injunction 
against future police “interfer[ence] with protests under conditions like the ones 
shown in the video.” 
The fact- and case-disposition items formed a highly reliable96 composite 
scale. Designated Pro_Protest, the scale furnished a continuous measure (stand-
ardized by z-score transformation) of each subject’s relative inclination to form 
pro-demonstrator fact perceptions and case-disposition judgments.97  
 
 94. The necessity of finding facts such as these, which parallel ones that the Supreme 
Court has indicated supply permissible grounds for restricting protest activity, see supra Part 
I.C, has been emphasized by lower courts that have rejected constitutional challenges to 
FACE. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 958 F. Supp. 761, 774-75 (D. Conn. 1997), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998). The court in Scott found that one 
defendant protestor had violated FACE by “physically obstructing and threatening persons 
seeking to enter and exit . . . in order to intimidate and interfere,” id. at 770, but that a second 
had not because “her intent in sidewalk counseling and leafleting [was] to persuade women 
to consider alternatives to abortion,” id. at 770-71. 
 95. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 96. Reliability measured using Cronbach’s α was 0.95. 
 97. Pro_Protest was constructed as a conventional composite Likert scale: items ex-
pressing a pro-police fact perception or outcome judgment were reverse coded to reflect a 
pro-protestor valence; scores on all response items were then normalized (via z-score trans-
formation) and added to form a composite score, which was itself normalized (via z-score 
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5. Analytic strategy 
Multivariate regression furnishes an appropriate and straightforward pro-
cedure for testing the study hypotheses.98 Because Pro_Protest supplies a more 
precise measure of the latent disposition to form pro-plaintiff reactions than do 
the individual items, the scale furnishes the most reliable outcome variable for 
testing the study hypotheses.99 The predictors in our study include the experi-
mental manipulation, which we denote by the variable Recruitment (abortion 
clinic = 0; recruitment center = 1); and subjects’ worldviews, represented by 
the variables Hierarchy and Individualism, which reflect their scores on the hi-
erarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism scales respective-
ly. To enable testing of hypotheses relating to the varying impact of subjects’ 
cultural worldviews in the two experimental conditions, we constructed prod-
uct-interaction terms: Hierarchy × Recruitment and Individualism × Recruit-
ment, which measure any difference that an increasing disposition toward hier-
archy or individualism, respectively, has on subjects’ fact- and case-disposition 
responses in the recruitment center as opposed to the abortion clinic condi-
tion.100 Three subjects failed to respond to one or more items. They were there-
fore omitted from the multivariate regression analysis. 
C. Results 
The study results appear in the regression analyses reported in Table 1. 
Predictors and cross-product interaction terms are entered in steps to promote 
interpretation of the contribution that the various predictors make to variance in 
reactions to the video, as measured by Pro_Protest. Model 3 incorporates all of 
the predictor and cross-product interaction terms that bear on the study hypoth-
eses.101 
 
transformation). See Eliot R. Smith, Research Design, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS 
IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 17, 31 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 
2000). 
 98. Charles M. Judd, Everyday Data Analysis in Social Psychology: Comparisons of 
Linear Models, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 97, at 370, 371-72 (outlining use of multivariate regression for 
analysis of experimental results and explaining advantages over ANOVA).  
 99. See supra note 85. 
100. See generally JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION 
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 375-83 (3d ed. 2003) (outlining and explaining 
the use of cross-product interaction terms in multivariate regression to model and test the 
hypothesis that the effect of a continuous predictor will vary across the levels of a categori-
cal one).  
101. The underlying regression equation in Model 3 is:  
Y = b1 × Recruitment + b2 × Hierarchy + b3 × Individualism + b4 × Hierarchy ×  
Recruitment + b5 × Individualism × Recruitment + constant  
where Y is the score on Pro_Protest, and b1-b5 are the coefficients for the specified predic-
tors and cross-product interaction variables. 
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Putting aside subjects’ cultural worldviews, the impact of being assigned to 
one experimental condition or another is negligible. The coefficient for Re-
cruitment indicates the impact of being assigned to the recruitment center as 
opposed to the abortion clinic condition. In Model 1, in which experimental as-
signment is the only predictor, the coefficient for Recruitment is close to zero 
and is statistically nonsignificant. 
Aggregate impressions not only were comparable between the two condi-
tions but were also closely divided within each. This conclusion is reflected 
clearly in the raw data.102 In the abortion clinic condition, 49% of the subjects 
indicated that they agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) that 
the police should be found liable for ordering the protestors to cease the 
demonstration. In the recruitment center condition, 45% of the subjects agreed 
the police should be found liable.103 Comparable proportions supported the 
proposition that the police should be enjoined from halting protests “under 
conditions like the ones shown in the video” (recruitment center, 46%; abortion 
clinic, 45%). The proportion who agreed that the protestors should be awarded 
damages was smaller, 25% in each condition. 
TABLE 1 













N = 196. Dependent variable is Pro_Protest, the composite response-item scale transformed 
to a z-score with a mean of 0. Predictor effects are measured with unstandardized linear (or-
dinary least squares) regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold type 
indicates that the predictor coefficient or change in F statistic is significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 
Considered apart from the experimental manipulation, cultural worldviews 
likewise appear to have no meaningful effect on reactions to the video. The co-
efficients for Hierarchy and Individualism in Model 2 indicate the impact of 
subjects’ scores on the indicated worldview variables averaged across the two 
conditions. Again, both coefficients are close to zero and are statistically 
 
102. See infra Figure 6. 
103. See infra Figure 6. 
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nonsignificant. There is no evidence, then, that being inclined either toward hi-
erarchy or egalitarianism, toward individualism or communitarianism, or to-
ward any combination of the two disposes individuals toward pro- or anti-
demonstrator reactions irrespective of what subjects believe about the political 
cause of the demonstrators. 
When cultural worldviews and experimental conditions are considered to-
gether, however, it becomes clear that who saw what did depend critically on 
the relationship between the demonstrators’ causes and the subjects’ own val-


















     
 
 
Bars indicate the percentage of subjects who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or 
“strongly”) with items proposing the indicated dispositions. 
 
 
The condition-specific effect of each worldview is reflected in Model 3.104 
Their impacts in the abortion clinic condition are indicated by the coefficient 
for Hierarchy, which is positive and significant, and by the coefficient for Indi-
vidualism, which is negative and significant.105 These results indicate that sub-
 
104. In Model 3, the coefficient for Recruitment and the constant are the effects of be-
ing assigned either to the military recruitment center condition or to the abortion clinic con-
dition, respectively, when the cultural worldviews are equal to zero or their mean values. 
Again, they are close to zero and statistically nonsignificant. One can thus conclude that the 
“culturally average” subject would react comparably in both conditions. 
105. The coefficients for each worldview predictor indicate the impact of the specified 
worldview scale when all other predictors equal zero, see LEONA S. AIKEN ET AL., MULTIPLE 
REGRESSION: TESTING AND INTERPRETING INTERACTIONS 123-25 (1991), which will be true 
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jects in the abortion clinic condition formed progressively more pro-
demonstrator fact perceptions and case-disposition preferences as their values 
became either more hierarchical or more communitarian; by the same token, 
they formed progressively more anti-demonstrator perceptions and preferences 
as their values became either more egalitarian or more individualistic. These 
relationships are reversed in the recruitment center condition: the negative coef-
ficients for Hierarchy × Recruitment and the positive ones for Individualism × 
Recruitment indicate that in that condition pro-demonstrator reactions dissipat-
ed as subjects become either more hierarchical or communitarian but grew as 
subjects become either more egalitarian or individualistic.106 It follows that 
subjects who were simultaneously more egalitarian and individualistic tended 
to form relatively extreme anti-demonstrator impressions in the abortion clinic 
condition and pro-demonstrator impressions in the recruitment center condi-
tion. Subjects who were simultaneously more hierarchical and communitarian 
tended to form exactly the opposite impressions. These results thus confirm the 
EI inversion and HC inversion hypotheses, and hence the EI/HC polarization 
hypothesis as well. 
It is more difficult to assess the remaining hypotheses by simply scrutiniz-
ing the regression outputs. Because Hierarchy and Individualism have opposite 
signs from each other in both conditions (and for each outcome variable), disa-
greement between subjects who are more hierarchical and individualistic, on 
the one hand, and those who are more egalitarian and communitarian, on the 
other, will necessarily be less extreme. This is consistent with the EC/HI 
semipolarization hypothesis, but cannot be determined to support either it or the 
EC bias and HI bias hypotheses unless the magnitudes of offsetting effects are 
estimated and compared in each condition. 
Those effects are plotted in Figure 5. Consistent with the EI and HC inver-
sion hypotheses, the estimated scores for egalitarian individualists and for hier-
archical communitarians scales flip across conditions.107 It is also evident from 
the estimates that egalitarian communitarians are significantly more pro-
demonstrator and hierarchical individualists significantly more anti-
demonstrator in the recruitment center condition than in the abortion clinic 
condition. Whereas the difference between egalitarian individualists and hierar-
chical communitarians is significant in both conditions, the difference between 
egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individualists is significant only in 
the recruitment center condition. This result fits the EC/HI semipolarization 
 
when a subject is assigned to the abortion clinic condition (Recruitment = 0) and has the 
mean score on the other worldview scale.  
106. The coefficient for each cross-product interaction variable indicates the unique in-
cremental effect associated with the indicated worldview in the recruitment center condition. 
See id. 
107. For purposes of these estimates, the values for the cultural worldview predictors 
were both set one standard deviation from their means in the directions necessary to form the 
specified worldview combinations. See AIKEN ET AL., supra note 105, at 13. 
KAHAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2012 11:40 AM 
880 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:851 
hypothesis, although we had not anticipated that there would in fact be no 
meaningful difference between egalitarian communitarian and hierarchical in-
dividualist subjects in the abortion clinic condition. 
The practical impact of these effects is readily illustrated by examining the 
responses for individual items. Subjects characterized (on the basis of their 
mean scores on the worldview scales) as egalitarian individualists and hierar-
chical communitarians reacted in strong and opposite ways to the experimental 
manipulation. In the abortion clinic condition, 70% of the hierarchical commu-
nitarians found that the police had violated the demonstrators’ rights. Yet in the 
recruitment center condition, only 16% did. Matters were the other way around 
for egalitarian individualists: 76% of them concluded that the police had violat-
ed the rights of the protestors in the military recruitment condition, yet only 
28% of them took that position in the abortion clinic condition.108 These pat-
terns fit the EI Inversion, HC Inversion, and EI/HC polarization hypotheses. 
FIGURE 5 















Graphs display the impact of culture-condition interactions tested in the multivariate regres-
sion analyses.109 Group estimates were formed by setting values for Hierarchy and Individu-
alism at one standard deviation above and below the mean in the specified directions. Confi-
dence intervals reflect 0.95 level of confidence. Change in each group’s score between 
conditions is significant at p < 0.05.110 
 
108. See infra Figure 6. 
109. See supra Table 1. 
110. The statistical significance of the difference between any group’s estimated score 
in one condition and its estimated score in another, and of the difference between any two 
groups’ estimated scores within a condition, must be determined by calculation. However, a 
rough visual heuristic is to consider whether the 0.95 confidence interval of one estimate 
overlaps with the point estimate of another (not the latter’s confidence interval, as is some-
times mistakenly stated). See generally Sarah Belia et al., Researchers Misunderstand Con-
fidence Intervals and Standard Error Bars, 10 PSYCHOL. METHODS 389, 393 (2005); Geoff 
Cumming & Sue Finch, Inference by Eye: Confidence Intervals and How to Read Pictures of 
Data, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 170 (2005); Nathaniel Schenker & Jane F. Gentleman, On Judging 
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FIGURE 6 



































Lines connect points indicating the percentage of subjects within each of the specified cul-
tural groups who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) with items propos-
ing the indicated dispositions. 
 
the Significance of Differences by Examining the Overlap Between Confidence Intervals, 55 
AM. STATISTICIAN 182 (2001). 
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Egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individualists also reacted as 
predicted. In the abortion clinic condition, 52% of both egalitarian communitar-
ians and hierarchical individualists found that the police abridged the protes-
tors’ right to free speech. In the recruitment center condition, the proportion of 
egalitarian communitarians who found a constitutional violation jumped to 
71%, while the proportion of hierarchical individualists who did fell to just 
17%.111 This pattern fits the EC and HI bias hypotheses, as well as the EC/HI 
semipolarization hypothesis. 
FIGURE 7 





















Lines connect points indicating the percentage of subjects within each of the specified cul-
tural groups who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) with items propos-
ing the indicated dispositions. 
 
 
There was comparable cultural dissensus over remedies. Majorities of egal-
itarian individualists (69%) and egalitarian communitarians (59%) favored en-
joining the police in the recruitment center condition, whereas only minorities 
of these subjects (egalitarian individualists, 12%; egalitarian communitarians, 
48%) did in the abortion clinic condition. Minorities of both hierarchical com-
munitarians (32%) and hierarchical individualists (17%) favored issuing an in-
junction against the police in the recruitment center condition; in the abortion 
 
111. See supra Figure 6. 
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clinic condition, the proportion of hierarchical communitarians who supported 
an injunction rose to 65%, and the proportion of hierarchical individualists to 
an even 50%.112 
Consistent with the sample-wide outcome, support among subjects of all 
worldviews was lower for damages than for injunctive relief. Nevertheless, for 
hierarchical communitarians and egalitarian individualists, in particular, the 
proportions supporting damages shifted within and between conditions in pat-
terns identical to the shifts on the other outcome measures.113 
As one would expect, these differences in case-disposition judgments are 
mirrored in the subjects’ responses to the fact-perception items. Whereas only 
39% of the hierarchical communitarians perceived that the protestors were 
blocking the pedestrians in the abortion clinic condition, for example, 74% of 
them saw blocking in the recruitment center condition.114 Only 45% of egalitar-
ian individualists, in contrast, saw blocking in the recruitment center condition, 
whereas in the abortion clinic condition 76% of them did.115 Fully 83% of hier-
archical individualists saw blocking in the recruitment center condition, up 
from 62% in the abortion clinic condition; a 56% majority of egalitarian com-
munitarians saw blocking in that condition, yet only 35% saw such conduct in 
the recruitment center condition.116 Responses on other items—such as wheth-
er the protestors “screamed in the face” of pedestrians—displayed similar pat-
terns. 
Relatively few subjects reported observing “spitting” (18%) or “shoving” 
(16%) by the protestors or “physical contact” (20%) between the protestors and 
the pedestrians.117 There was also no meaningful cultural variation with respect 
to these items. This result suggests that the influence of values was confined to 
facts on which there was at least modest room for interpretation. It also helps to 
confirm that the subjects were not responding in a consciously biased manner 
in general. 
III. ANALYZING, APPRAISING, AND ADVOCATING 
A. Summary of Results 
The theoretical aim of the study was to test the hypothesis that culturally 
motivated cognition would influence individuals’ perceptions of facts essential 
to distinguishing “speech” from “conduct” for purposes of the First Amend-
ment. The results strongly supported this hypothesis. Our subjects all viewed 
 
112. See supra Figure 6. 
113. See supra Figure 6. 
114. See supra Figure 7. 
115. See supra Figure 7. 
116. See supra Figure 7. 
117. See supra Figure 7. 
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the same video. But what they saw—earnest voicing of dissent intended only to 
persuade, or physical intimidation calculated to interfere with the freedom of 
others—depended on the congruence of the protestors’ positions with the sub-
jects’ own cultural values. 
Motivated cognition not only polarized individuals of diverse cultural out-
looks but also generated contradictions in what subjects of a shared orientation 
reported seeing. Relatively hierarchical and communitarian subjects rejected 
the proposition, credited by relatively egalitarian and individualistic ones, that 
demonstrators were blocking access to a facility represented to be an abortion 
clinic; yet when hierarchical communitarians understood the demonstrators to 
be objecting to the exclusion of openly gay and lesbian citizens from the mili-
tary, they agreed the protestors were blocking access to the same building—a 
claim that egalitarian individualists overwhelmingly dismissed. Subjects sub-
scribing to a hierarchical individualistic outlook, as well as those adhering to an 
egalitarian communitarian one, exhibited similar shifts in perception.  
We focused on our subjects’ cultural worldviews because of the demon-
strated role of these outlooks in shaping perceptions of risk and related facts 
relevant to policy and law.118 Our results thus suggest the utility of cultural-
 
118. It is reasonable to surmise that the controversies featured in this study would di-
vide subjects along other lines in addition to cultural outlooks as we measure them. For ex-
ample, women (55%) were more likely than men (37%) to agree that the police should be 
enjoined from halting future demonstrations. The proportions of both male and female sub-
jects who supported this outcome, however, did not differ meaningfully across conditions. 
Thus, cultural variance obviously cannot be attributed or reduced to gender variance. Politi-
cal party affiliation did register sensitivity to the experimental manipulation: in the abortion 
clinic condition, the majority of Democrats (57%) opposed an injunctive remedy, and a ma-
jority of Republicans (62%) favored it; in the recruitment center condition, a majority of Re-
publicans (67%) opposed and a majority of Democrats (61%) favored such an outcome. Of 
course, this simple partisan inversion of impressions is necessarily less nuanced than the 
cross-cutting shifts observed when members of the sample were classified simultaneously 
along the two cultural dimensions. Moreover, among the one-third of the sample that did not 
identify themselves as either Democrats or Republicans, there was again no difference be-
tween the abortion clinic and military recruitment conditions. We are eager to add, however, 
that we regard the question “What has the biggest impact—culture, gender, political ideolo-
gy, race, etc.?” as ill-posed. Cultural worldviews tend to cohere with other characteristics—
including political affiliation, gender, race, and class—in patterns that indicate the same la-
tent predispositions that the cultural worldviews by themselves measure. See Kahan, supra 
note 74, at 740-42. When forced to choose—as one often is, by sample size—cultural 
worldviews can be expected to be more discerning indicators of these predispositions, and 
hence stronger predictors of cultural variance in cognition, than these other characteristics. 
See Kahan et al., supra note 41, at 505 n.5. Ideally, however, nonlinear scaling and classifi-
cation techniques, such as grade-of-membership modeling and latent-class analysis, could be 
used to form even more discerning and hence even more predictive measures of cultural pre-
dispositions based on appropriate combinations of cultural worldviews and related identify-
ing characteristics. See generally Kenneth G. Manton et al., The Use of Grade-of-
Membership Techniques to Estimate Regression Relationships, 22 SOC. METHODOLOGY 321 
(1992); Richard F. Potthoff et al., Dirichlet Generalizations of Latent-Class Models, 17 J. 
CLASSIFICATION 315 (2000). Such an analysis would likely add resolution and detail to the 
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cognition theory for measuring the impact and explaining the sources of moti-
vated reasoning in constitutional decisionmaking as well.119 
B. Cognitive Illiberalism and the Constitution 
The practical motivation for this study was to focus attention on the danger 
that cognitive illiberalism can pose to constitutional law. We use this term to 
refer to the vulnerability of political and legal decisionmakers to betray their 
commitment to liberal neutrality by unconsciously fitting their perceptions of 
risk and related facts to their sectarian understandings of the good life. This is 
the dynamic, we believe, that transforms seemingly empirical debates over how 
to protect the environment, promote public health, and secure the nation from 
external threats into occasions for divisive group-based status competition.120 
Our study results show how readily constitutional decisionmaking can become 
infected by this pathology. 
In our subjects, cognitive illiberalism eviscerated the line between 
“speech” and “conduct.” The speech-conduct distinction can be seen as one 
doctrinal device courts employ to test whether a regulation conforms to liberal 
prohibitions on governmental promotion of a moral or political orthodoxy: by 
requiring that a regulation be shown to promote a governmental interest inde-
pendent of hostility to any particular idea, the teleological conception of the 
speech-conduct divide assures that law is used to pursue secular goods of value 
to all citizens regardless of their cultural outlooks.121 Enforcing this test, how-
ever, necessarily requires decisionmakers to make critical determinations of 
fact: in the case of a mass demonstration, for example, did the protestors intend 
to intimidate or only persuade? Were the protestors simply expressing impas-
sioned dissent, or did they impose themselves on members of the public in an 
 
picture of motivated cognition that our data reveal. But it would still be culturally motivated 
cognition that is being observed. 
119. We used a video to elicit evidence of cultural cognition because of the utility of a 
visual stimulus for the experimental design and because of the prevalence of video proof in 
real-world cases that involve First Amendment challenges to restrictions on protest activity. 
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Our results reinforce the concerns and cautions of 
authors who have emphasized the risk that judges and jurors will invest video proofs, which 
are becoming increasingly common, with more weight than they are due. See NEAL 
FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 1-17 (2009); Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. 
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 17, 17-32 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Video 
Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE J. 180, 
180-84 (2008). Nevertheless, the impact of cultural cognition is by no means limited to visu-
al perception. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 40, at 87-88 (showing the biased assimila-
tion of evidence in written materials). Nor is there any reason to believe that videos are a 
form of trial proof uniquely vulnerable to the effects of culturally motivated cognition. See 
Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 900-01.  
120. See Kahan, supra note 7, at 127-28. 
121. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 818-19; see also supra Part I.A. 
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assaultive or invasive manner (e.g., “screaming in their faces”)? Were onlook-
ers genuinely frightened of physical assault, or merely angry, offended, or pos-
sibly even ashamed by exposure to the protestors’ message? Did law enforce-
ment actors intervene to preempt incitement to violence or only to quell a 
public backlash propelled by animosity toward the demonstrators’ point of 
view? For our subjects, the answers were decisively shaped by the congruence 
between the protestors’ message and the subjects’ own cultural worldviews. As 
a result, in the course of certifying that the law was free of culturally partisan 
influence, they ended up infusing it with exactly that. 
Other First Amendment doctrines also seem vulnerable to this type of sub-
version. Like the speech-conduct distinction, the so-called “time, place, man-
ner” doctrine requires that regulations be justified on the basis of an “interest 
. . . unrelated to the suppression of free speech.”122 It thus requires the same 
sort of factfinding, subject to the same danger of motivated cognition and the 
same dangers of polarization.123 
In addition, valid “time, place, manner” restrictions must be “content neu-
tral”—that is, applicable without regard to speakers’ topics or points of 
view.124 Regulators might try to evade this requirement by resorting to seem-
ingly general regulations (say, that marchers acquire liability insurance for a 
particular level of damages) that, in practice, meaningfully limit only a disfa-
vored point of view (Ku Klux Klan members proposing to march in a predomi-
nantly Jewish community).125 Or regulators might apply a facially neutral pro-
vision (e.g., on the number of groups that will be issued permits to march on a 
given day) in a selective manner that reflects their animosity toward a particular 
message or idea (“Irish gay pride,” on St. Patrick’s Day).126 We expect search-
ing First Amendment review to give the lie to such stratagems.127 But if legal 
 
122. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1984). 
123. Cf. id. at 298 (stating that the “four-factor standard . . . for validating a regulation 
of expressive conduct . . . in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard ap-
plied to time, place, or manner restrictions”). 
124. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). 
125. Cf. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1209 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Village has flatly 
prohibited First Amendment activity, not itself directly productive of the feared injury, by 
those too controversial to obtain commercial insurance.”). 
126. Cf. Olivieri v. Ward, 637 F. Supp. 851, 876 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding logistical concerns to be a pretext for denying gay 
rights group a permit to assemble in public forum along St. Patrick’s Day parade route). But 
cf. Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 918 F. Supp. 732, 742-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (uphold-
ing reliance on content-neutral criteria involving traffic disruption and public safety to deny 
marching permit to gay and lesbian group). 
127. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In 
some cases, a censorial justification will not be apparent from the face of a regulation which 
draws distinctions based on content, and the government will tender a plausible justification 
unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas. There the compelling-interest test may be 
one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in 
fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law.”); Kagan, supra note 9, at 
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decisionmakers cannot shake the influence of culturally motivated cognition, 
how can we be confident that they themselves will reliably perceive that a regu-
lator is defying the content-neutrality requirement in one of these ways? Why 
shouldn’t we expect those decisionmakers to be perceived by those who see 
things otherwise as having fit their conclusions to their values? 
The same dynamics inhere in First Amendment standards relating to “un-
protected” and “low value” categories of speech. Authorities can ban obscenity 
but not pornography, fighting words but not dissent; yet contested cultural 
meanings might well be exactly what a legal decisionmaker is perceiving when 
she distinguishes members of the protected categories of one (a woman depict-
ed as enjoying adulterous sex;128 the burning of a flag129) from members of the 
unprotected ones (a woman depicted as enjoying forced sex;130 the burning of a 
cross131). The First Amendment demands proof when regulators invoke “sec-
ondary effects”—traffic congestion, disruption of commerce, increased inci-
dence of crime, and the like—to justify zoning restrictions on strip clubs and 
other forms of “low value” speech.132 But if legal decisionmakers’ own ability 
to weigh the proffered evidence is affected by motivated cognition, they will do 
a poor, or at least a suspect, job of distinguishing pretext from truth. 
Indeed, we suspect this point can be generalized to constitutional theory as 
a whole. As discussed, the First Amendment can be integrated into a general 
theory that reads the Constitution as implementing the liberal prohibition on 
state endorsement of partisan conceptions of the good life.133 Like the First 
Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses require courts to 
“strictly scrutinize” proffered secular rationales—public health, deterrence of 
criminal violence, national security, and the like—to “flush out” the impact, 
conscious or unconscious, of regulators’ animosity toward those whose identity 
or values defy dominant norms.134 But if legal decisionmakers, like everyone 
 
454 (“[T]he strict scrutiny test operates as a measure of governmental motive.”); Rubenfeld, 
supra note 12, at 786 (stating that the First Amendment strict scrutiny test can be conceived 
of as “a device for smoking out impermissible purposes”). 
128. Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).  
129. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Th[is] 
case has nothing to do with ‘disagreeable ideas.’ It involves disagreeable conduct . . . .” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
130. Cf. Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331-33 (7th Cir. 1985). 
131. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (explaining that cross-burning has “communicative content—a message of 
racial, religious, or gender hostility”). 
132. See generally City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-39 (2002) 
(plurality opinion) (explaining that governing authority must furnish “evidence . . . [to] sup-
port its rationale” and cannot “get away with shoddy data or reasoning”). 
133. See supra Part I.A. 
134. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 473 n.24 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The discreteness 
and insularity warranting a ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ must . . . be viewed from a so-
cial and cultural perspective as well as a political one. To this task judges are well suited, for 
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else, are unconsciously motivated by their cultural affiliations, then they—like 
everyone else—are more or less likely to see challenged laws as contributing to 
the attainment of secular ends depending on whether those laws affirm or deni-
grate their own cultural commitments. Angry denunciations of judges who have 
thrown their lot in with one or the another of the belligerents in the American 
“culture wars” is itself a form of status conflict characteristic of cognitive illib-
eralism.135 
Some legal commentators136 (and historically certain jurists137) have criti-
cized constitutional standards that “balance” constitutional liberties against 
“compelling interests,” such as national security, public order, and diversity. 
The phenomenon of culturally motivated cognition vindicates their anxiety that 
such “tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions 
of those doing the balancing.”138 But our study results suggest that these com-
mentators are too quick to assume that their preferred alternative to balanc-
ing—such as the “teleological conception” of the speech-conduct distinction, 
the “anticaste” principle,139 the liberal “harm” criterion,140 and the like—will 
necessarily avoid such entanglement. The primary implication of our study—
the main message we are trying to get across—is that constitutional theorists 
have paid too much attention to explicating the normative content of various 
free speech standards and too little to the psychology of enforcing them. 
 
the lessons of history and experience are surely the best guide as to when, and with respect to 
what interests, society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or 
view them as not belonging to the community.” (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938))). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146 (1980) (stating that strict scrutiny “flushes 
out” illicit motivation in equal protection analysis); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 
YALE L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997) (same). 
135. See generally J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2320 
(1997) (examining dynamics by which Supreme Court decisions become a focus for status 
competition among competing cultural groups). 
136. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 134, at 441-43 (arguing against interest balancing 
in equal protection analysis); Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 778-93 (arguing against interest 
balancing in free speech analysis). 
137. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I be-
lieve that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement 
of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights 
did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done in this field.”). 
138. Ely, supra note 13, at 1501. 
139. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 
(1994). 
140. See generally Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and 
Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2005); Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After Law-
rence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005). 
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C. Judges, Jurors, and Citizens 
We have been assessing the potential impact and implications of culturally 
motivated cognition on constitutional decisionmaking. It should not be as-
sumed, however, that all constitutional factfinders think in the same way. The 
design and sample we used in this study furnish evidence of how members of 
the public might be influenced by cultural cognition as jurors called upon to 
make findings of fact pertinent to the speech-conduct distinction and related 
doctrines.141 But oftentimes—when protestors seek a preliminary injunction 
against police interference with a planned rally or march, for example—judges 
will make these sorts of findings. Indeed, how likely such determinations are to 
be made by judges rather than jurors can be influenced by appropriate adjust-
ments in the standards used to decide threshold motions or to review findings 
of fact on appeal. Do the study results furnish insight on how factfinding and 
related decisionmaking tasks should be allocated between judges and jurors? 
We addressed a similar question in a previous article. In it, we examined 
the impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of a high-speed car chase that 
came to an end when the police deliberately rammed the fleeing motorist’s ve-
hicle, causing a fiery crash that left the driver paralyzed.142 The Supreme Court 
(in an 8-1 opinion) had held that “no reasonable jury” whose members viewed 
a videotape of the chase shot from inside the pursuing police cruisers could side 
with the motorist on the “factual issue whether [he] was driving in such fashion 
as to endanger human life.”143 Yet when we showed the video to a representa-
tive sample of over a thousand members of the public, we found significant 
levels of disagreement between cultural groups on exactly that. We thus con-
cluded that judges’ own perceptions of fact can sometimes furnish them with 
unreliable guidance on what “reasonable” but culturally diverse people are like-
ly to perceive,144 a position since forcefully amplified by critics of Supreme 
 
141. Studies suggest that mock jurors’ reactions to detailed trial vignettes are strongly 
predictive of how they respond to more vivid forms of proof, including the testimony of live 
witnesses. See Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury 
Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 81-83 (1999). In addition, the views of individual 
jurors after consideration of the evidence are generally thought to be predictive of how 
they’ll vote at the conclusion of deliberations. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision 
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 622, 690-92 (2001). Once the relationship between individual cultural worldviews and 
first-ballot votes is established, computer simulations can furnish additional insight into the 
probability of final verdicts in various kinds of cases conditional on the worldviews (and 
other characteristics) of the individuals on any particular jury. See Maggie Wittlin, The Re-
sults of Deliberation 15-20 (June 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865031. 
142. Kahan et al., supra note 5. 
143. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
144. See Kahan et al., supra note 5.  
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Court decisions that expand the power of judges to grant motions for dismissal 
or for summary judgment.145  
The results of the present study might be understood to furnish even more 
support for such a critique. Those results reinforce our previous study with ex-
perimental evidence that what people see in trial proof will often turn on who 
they are. If one thinks that adjudication will be more accurate or more legiti-
mate if informed by a diversity of culturally grounded perceptions, then the law 
should be fashioned and applied in a manner that fortifies the central role of the 
jury in determining the facts. 
But we can also see how, in the context of this study in particular, one 
might draw exactly the opposite conclusion. After all, one might well think that 
the point of constitutional review is to insulate the law (or at least certain as-
pects of it) from the influence of—and conflict over—partisan worldviews. In-
deed, our finding that the same individual might well see the facts differently 
depending on her evaluation of protestors’ messages seems to involve exactly 
the sort of content-based discrimination that the First Amendment is understood 
to prohibit. In this and similar types of cases, then, one might advocate enlarg-
ing the role of courts in factfinding through a relatively aggressive exercise of 
summary adjudication powers or through more penetrating forms of appellate 
review—procedures that both have foundation in the Court’s First Amendment 
precedents.146 
Such a position, though, assumes that judges are less prone to culturally 
motivated cognition than jurors. There is in fact convincing evidence that judg-
es, when engaged in certain tasks distinctive of their professional role, are bet-
ter able to resist various forms of at least some cognitive biases than are lay 
 
145. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 96-97 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) 
(arguing that Supreme Court’s “judicial experience and common sense” standard for judging 
a motion to dismiss complaint is “an invitation to ‘cognitive illiberalism’”); Arthur R. Miller, 
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-26 & n.90 (2010) (citing study to critique newly announced “plausibility” 
standard used to judge sufficiency of a claim); Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and 
Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1465-66 & n.119 
(2010) (citing study to critique liberal summary judgment standards); Adam N. Steinman, 
The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1313 n.121 (2010) (arguing on the basis of 
study results that courts’ judgments on the factual “plausibility” of allegations in complaints 
are unreliable). 
146. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (requiring 
plaintiffs to show malice with clear and convincing evidence at the summary judgment state 
of litigation); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508, 514 (1984) 
(authorizing appellate courts to “conduct an independent review of the evidence” in First 
Amendment cases). See generally 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
MARY KAY KAYNE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730, at 15 (3d ed. 1998) 
(“[S]ummary adjudication may be thought of as a useful procedural tool” to reduce litigation 
cost incident to asserting First Amendment rights); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (discussing use of more searching appellate review 
in constitutional cases). 
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people under similar circumstances.147 So the proposition that judges might be 
more successful than ordinary jurors in checking the influence of cultural cog-
nition is a plausible enough conjecture. 
Nevertheless, what judges themselves say about what they see in cases like 
the ones featured in our study makes a contrary hypothesis plausible, too.148 To 
begin, they report observing different things. In the 1965 decision of Cox v. 
Louisiana, for example, the Supreme Court found no support for the finding of 
a trial court judge that civil rights protestors were on the verge of a violent 
rampage when arrested:  
Our conclusion that the entire meeting from the beginning until its dispersal 
by tear gas was orderly and not riotous is confirmed by a film of the events 
taken by a television news photographer, which was offered in evidence as a 
state exhibit. We have viewed the film, and it reveals that the students, though 
they undoubtedly cheered and clapped, were well-behaved throughout.149 
Thirty years later, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., it was Jus-
tice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who took issue 
with trial court findings on the basis of a film, this time a videotape put into ev-
idence by parties seeking to enjoin an abortion clinic protest.150 Justice Scalia 
described the tape as “show[ing] . . . a great many forms of expression” includ-
ing “chanting, . . . shouting, . . . peaceful picketing, . . . [and] efforts to per-
suade individuals not to have abortions,” but no “suggestion of violence near 
the clinic” or “any attempt to prevent entry or exit.”151  
 
147. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) (showing power of 
judges to resist various biases at least in some circumstances); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial De-
cision Making, 86 JUDICATURE J. 44, 50 (2002) (identifying means by which judges can min-
imize effects of cognitive illusions in deciding cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Un-
conscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221-25 (2009) 
(finding that judges are able to resist implicit racial bias when motivated to do so).  
148. See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 
139-40 (2010) (attributing judicial conflict over employment law decisions to cultural cogni-
tion); cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (concluding that cultural cog-
nition influences judges but “only when empirical claims cannot be verified or falsified by 
objective data”). 
149. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 547 (1965) (footnote omitted). Compare Edwards 
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234-36 (1963) (overturning based on “independent exami-
nation of the whole record” a trial court finding that civil rights protestors’ behavior was 
“likely to produce violence,” as required under state criminal breach-of-peace statute (quot-
ing State v. Edwards, 123 S.E.2d 247, 249 (S.C. 1961))), with id. at 244 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing) (“The imminence of that danger has been emphasized at every stage of this proceeding 
. . . . This record . . . shows no steps backward from a standard of ‘clear and present dan-
ger.’”). 
150. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 784-90 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
151. Id. at 790. 
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Judges not only report seeing different things when they make and review 
findings of fact akin to those in our study; they also attribute disagreements 
with their own views to bad faith on the part of their colleagues. Intimating an 
ideological double standard, Justice Scalia in Madsen asserted that anyone 
“who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not to mention some 
other social protests,” would “be aghast at” the Court’s rulings after viewing 
the abortion clinic protest videotape.152 Dissenting in Cox decades earlier, Jus-
tice Clark had made a similar charge of political favoritism: rebuking the Court 
for turning a blind eye to “an effort to influence and intimidate” through “the 
staging of a modern Donnybrook Fair” by a “mob of young Negroes” outside 
the local courthouse, Justice Clark stated, “I have always been taught that this 
Nation was dedicated to freedom under law not under mobs, whether they be 
integrationists or white supremacists.”153 Reactions such as these are at least 
suggestive of naive realism—the simultaneous apprehension of motivated rea-
soning in others and blindness to it in oneself, a dynamic that reinforces the 
power of empirical debates to spark illiberal status competition in democratic 
political life generally.154  
Indeed, how ordinary citizens perceive judges’ findings of “constitutional 
fact” is as important as the impact of cultural cognition, if any, on judges. For 
decisions to be legitimate—for them to gain assent and to justify expectations 
of obedience155—it isn’t enough that the law rely on decisionmakers who are 
psychologically capable of resisting motivated reasoning; it must also succeed 
in assuring citizens that those decisionmakers’ findings are genuinely untainted 
by cultural partisanship.156 Supreme Court decisions applying the speech-
conduct distinction fail to furnish such assurance. On the contrary, echoing the 
Court’s own dissenters, citizens of one or another cultural outlook routinely ac-
cuse the Court of bias.157 Citizens who hold a rival outlook reciprocate, de-
 
152. Id. at 786. 
153. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 585-89 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting); see 
also id. at 584 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Those who encourage minority 
groups to believe that the United States Constitution and federal laws give them a right to 
patrol and picket in the streets whenever they choose, in order to advance what they think to 
be a just and noble end, do no service to those minority groups, their cause, or their coun-
try.” (emphasis added)). 
154. See supra Part I.B.  
155. See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 884-85. 
156. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Dis-
cretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 703, 708 (1994). 
157. See, e.g., Ann Coulter, The Abortion Exception: The Left v. the Constitution, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 19, 2001), http://old.nationalreview.com/coulter/ 
coulterprint041901.html (describing the Court’s decisions upholding restrictions on abortion 
clinic demonstrations as the “abortion exception to the Flynt Amendment”); Richard L. 
Hasen, Crush Democracy but Save the Kittens, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.slate 
.com/id/2252536 (arguing that Justice Alito is guilty of an “indefensible double standard 
when it comes to free speech” because he purports to see “a sufficiently important govern-
KAHAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2012 11:40 AM 
April 2012] COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM 893 
nouncing the Court’s critics for flouting the authority of the law. Far from qui-
eting illiberal status competition, constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court 
(in this area and in others) thus become just another impetus to it.158 
Ironically, one of the remedies the law prescribes for treating anxiety over 
partisan decisionmaking is the jury. Perhaps “from the mode of their selection, 
coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant 
with the practical affairs of life,” jurors will enjoy advantages over a single 
judge, whose “habits and course of life” are necessarily peculiar, in ascertain-
ing the truth when facts are disputed.159 But wholly apart from enhanced accu-
racy, the law also hopes that conspicuously including representatives of as 
many diverse perspectives as possible in the decisionmaking process will vouch 
for the impartiality and fairness of the result, particularly in the minds of those 
citizens who might have the most reason to be suspicious of or disappointed by 
it.160 When judges offer their views of the “facts” in cases like Madsen and 
Cox—“protesters continued to impede access to the clinic” and forced patients 
and staff “to run . . . a gauntlet” to enter;161—the order to disperse by “the 
Chief of Police ar[ose] from the laudable motive to avoid violence and possible 
bloodshed”162—citizens understand them to be proclaiming whose group and 
whose way of seeing the world are virtuous and honorable and whose vicious 
and corrupt.163 The hope is that if citizens see instead that those facts were cer-
 
ment interest” in animal torture videos but is “blind to the strong governmental interests at 
play” in “prevent[ing] corruption” in corporate campaign donations). 
158. See generally Balkin, supra note 135 (highlighting the importance of understand-
ing status competition in society to achieving democratic ideals in constitutional interpreta-
tion). 
159. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862). Or perhaps not. See Bruce D. Spencer, 
Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 327 (2007) 
(finding judges in the study to incorrectly convict more often than juries, but to incorrectly 
acquit less often).  
160. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discrimina-
tory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons 
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”). 
161. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994). 
162. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 585 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). 
163. At least some (likely all) of the Justices know that when the Court characterizes 
the behavior of such parties as unprotected conduct rather than protected speech, they are 
effectively saying that those citizens’ moral vision is so utterly unworthy of respect that the 
law needn’t afford them the dignity of being able to make it the basis of public appeals to 
others:  
The vital principle of [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992)] was that in defined instances the woman’s decision whether to abort her 
child was in its essence a moral one, a choice the State could not dictate. . . . [T]hose who 
oppose it are remitted to debate the issue in its moral dimensions. In a cruel way, the Court 
today turns its back on that balance. It in effect tells us the moral debate is not so important 
after all . . . . 
. . . The Court tears away from the protestors the guarantees of the First Amendment 
when they most need it. So committed is the Court to its course that it denies these protestors, 
in the face of what they consider to be one of life’s gravest moral crises, even the opportunity 
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tified by a jury whose members included individuals who share those citizens’ 
experiences and outlooks, then citizens will see the findings of fact—this 
group, on this occasion, did or did not cross the line from persuasion to intimi-
dation—as simply that.164  
Although we suspect that jury factfinding does indeed at least sometimes 
perform this valuable function, we think it is implausible to believe that it in-
variably does. In the sort of cases we have featured in this study (and in many 
others),165 the perception that jury factfinding, too, is pervaded by partisan 
worldviews is widespread. Indeed, the anxiety that jurors won’t or can’t put 
their values aside in such cases is the reason thoughtful judges and lawmak-
ers—in doctrines that enlarge the scope of summary adjudication or the depth 
of appellate review in First Amendment cases,166 in statutes like the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act,167 and in decisions denying criminal defendants a jury trial in crim-
inal prosecutions under FACE168—often steer constitutional factfinding to 
judges. As our study suggests, their worries are by no means groundless. 
Of course, more research is necessary on the impact of cultural cognition 
on both judges and jurors. But to think that what such investigation will dis-
close is that cognitive illiberalism is simply not a problem for constitutional law 
strikes us as objectionably naive. Identifying effective strategies aimed at coun-
teracting its impact, both on constitutional decisionmakers’ perceptions of facts 
and on ordinary citizens’ perceptions of constitutional decisionmaking, should 
be one of the central aims of future empirical inquiry. 
 
to try to offer a fellow citizen a little pamphlet, a handheld paper seeking to reach a higher 
law. 
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 791-92 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
164. See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248-49 (1986) 
(describing the role of the jury in promoting public acceptance of legal determinations). 
165. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 5 (identifying cultural cognition in citizens’ per-
ceptions of facts in controversial self-defense cases as a source of high-profile political con-
flict over particular verdicts). 
166. See supra note 145. 
167. See Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 167 (1969). 
168. See, e.g., United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(finding a six-month maximum prison term and maximum $10,000 fine for a first offense 
under FACE was insufficiently severe to entitle defendant to jury trial); United States v. 
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). 
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D. Debiasing169 
What sorts of solutions might there be to the problem of culturally motivat-
ed reasoning in constitutional law? As we have indicated, the empirical work 
necessary for a complete answer is yet to be done. Nevertheless, extrapolating 
from what is known, we offer some reflections that we hope might be useful 
both to other scholars interested in investigating this issue and to 
decisionmakers committed to doing the best they can in the meantime.170 
1. Affirmation and jury selection 
The foundation of culturally motivated cognition is “identity threat.” An 
individual who comes to see behavior important to his cultural group as detri-
mental to society risks estrangement from those on whom he depends for mate-
rial and emotional support. If the behavior is a source of status for the individu-
al or for the group, then the prospect that others might form such a belief can 
diminish an individual’s social standing generally. The mechanisms that cultur-
al cognition comprises—from biased assimilation to selective attention and re-
call to skewed perceptions of expert credibility—all derive from the impulse to 
dismiss evidence that has these identity-threatening consequences.171 
But this dynamic can be reversed. When information is presented under 
conditions that effectively affirm an individual’s identity, that individual is far 
less likely simply to dismiss evidence and arguments that challenge a belief 
 
169. We use the concept of “debiasing” here without apology but subject to a proviso 
that we want to make emphatically clear. We reject the idea that the perceptions informed by 
cultural cognition are invariably unworthy of moral respect. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110 (2006). Such perceptions are different from 
judgments attributable to “base rate neglect,” the “gambler’s fallacy,” “hindsight bias,” and 
other manifestations of bounded rationality. They are not a consequence of limitations on our 
ability to process information pertinent to estimating the utility of one or another course of 
action; they are a reflection of values integral to our identities and our ties to others. In some 
settings, we might regard perceptions informed by cultural cognition as regrettable miscues 
that we should take precautions to avoid or correct. But in many contexts we will view them 
as furnishing reliable and unique insight into how we, as people of particular defining com-
mitments, should orient ourselves toward some contingency: just as we are enabled to expe-
rience a valued form of shared identity by genuinely seeing things in the way a fan of this 
team, or as a parent of this child, characteristically would, so we reliably affirm our com-
mitment to shared ways of life by attending appropriately to societal risks and opportunities 
that bear certain special meanings. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk 
Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 760-65 (2008). In sum, we believe cultural cognition 
can be either a faculty of moral perception or a cognitive bias depending on whether its ef-
fect on judgment promotes or frustrates ends that are morally appropriate to the settings and 
roles we inhabit.  
170. In the same spirit of pragmatic conjecture, Paul Secunda offers a thoughtful set of 
techniques for counteracting cultural cognition in Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism 
and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777104. 
171. See generally Sherman & Cohen, supra note 43, at 187-89. 
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characteristic of his defining group. By securing the individual’s sense of self-
worth, affirmation supplies a buffer against the psychic cost associated with 
giving open-minded evaluation to threatening information. This dynamic has 
been demonstrated experimentally in connection with a variety of issues, from 
abortion to capital punishment to cancer risks.172 
We surmise that affirmation strategies could be used to counteract cultural 
cognition in jurors. In the laboratory, researchers induce affirmation by in-
structing subjects to identify positive characteristics of themselves or their 
groups and thereafter complete a writing exercise or survey that focuses sub-
jects’ attention on the importance of that characteristic.173 We believe such a 
technique could be used with prospective jurors when the venire is assembled. 
Administered at that stage, the affirmation stimulus would likely strike jurors as 
an element of the jury selection process rather than as a device intended to en-
hance open-minded appraisal of the evidence—a perception that could negate 
the technique’s effectiveness. In addition, the benefit of affirmation in promot-
ing open-mindedness on the part of the selected jurors would continue through-
out the presentation of evidence. 
2. Deliberative depolarization 
Jurors, as well as judges on multimember appellate courts, engage in group 
decisionmaking. Counteracting culturally motivated reasoning in constitutional 
law thus requires attention to how deliberation interacts with the mechanisms 
cultural cognition comprises. 
Research on deliberation in general suggests that it can both accentuate and 
mitigate group polarization.174 Which outcome occurs is likely to depend on 
how the interaction shapes the participants’ sense of the relationship between 
the issue for determination and their group identities. Initial evidence that cor-
roborates expectations of stark group divisions is likely to feed on itself be-
cause of the tendency of individuals to credit the arguments of those who share 
their identities and because of the motivation of individuals to protect their 
connection to their group. Unexpected indications of moderation or equivoca-
tion within groups, however, can trigger convergence: the willingness of others 
in her group to express uncertainty conveys to a person that the identity cost of 
entertaining the opposing view is lower than she might otherwise have be-
 
172. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased 
Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151, 1162-63 
(2000); David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-
Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
119, 120-22 (2002). 
173. See Amy McQueen & William M.P. Klein, Experimental Manipulations of Self-
Affirmation: A Systematic Review, 5 SELF & IDENTITY 289, 295-97 (2006).  
174. See generally JOHN GASTIL, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DELIBERATION 60-62 
(2008). 
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lieved; in addition, the expression of openness or ambivalence by those in the 
opposing group dispels the animosity associated with naive realism and gener-
ates instead a reciprocal motivation to display cooperative open-mindedness.175 
Experimental work also suggests a procedure that might promote this ef-
fect: obliging each participant to speak in turn and to identify not only his or 
her own position but also the strongest counterargument to it. People tend to 
overestimate how uniformly and intensely members of their own and the other 
group hold their respective views. Eager to avoid estranging themselves from 
their peers, those who are equivocal are likely to keep silent or even misrepre-
sent their impressions. Strategic reticence of this sort tends to reinforce individ-
uals’ overestimation of how sharply they are divided and to increase self-
reinforcing signals of group division early on.176 The aim of obliging everyone 
to acknowledge counterarguments is to puncture this bubble of shared misun-
derstanding. This device creates a form of procedural immunity for the expres-
sion of equivocation. Nevertheless, speakers afforded this protection are likely 
to succeed in communicating the force and genuineness of their ambivalence. 
Thus, not only are dynamics that generate overstated signals of dissent 
preempted, but existing reservoirs of equivocation are forced to the surface, 
where their positive effects in generating deliberative give-and-take can be 
felt.177 
This technique could be used with jurors. It would be a simple matter for 
judges to instruct jurors to make each member’s expression of both his or her 
views and the strongest counterarguments the first order of business when they 
commence deliberations. There is also likely to be synergy between this proce-
dure and the use of identity affirmation at the jury-selection stage since affirma-
tion increases the likelihood that individuals will in fact have given sympathetic 
attention to evidence contrary to their cultural predispositions. 
It’s also possible that this device could be used with appellate judges. 
There is at least some evidence that the quantity and quality of deliberations 
breaks down ideological voting patterns on multimember appellate panels.178 
We hypothesize that courts that enjoy a better deliberative culture might in fact 
be ones whose members have cultivated the norm of acknowledging equivoca-
tion and doubt when they deliberate. 
 
175. See generally David K. Sherman et al., Naïve Realism and Affirmative Action: Ad-
versaries Are More Similar than They Think, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 275, 286-
87 (2003). 
176. See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1996).  
177. See Sherman et al., supra note 175, at 287. 
178. See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical 
Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1895, 1963-66 (2009). 
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3. Judicial aporia  
As we have indicated, how citizens of diverse outlooks react to the percep-
tions of constitutional decisionmakers is as important as what those 
decisionmakers actually see. Much like the subjects in our experiment, ordinary 
citizens draw culturally congenial inferences from salient snippets of evidence 
and conclude that decisionmakers who purport to see things differently are en-
gaged in partisan rationalization.  
In the domain of constitutional law, we believe this effect is actually mag-
nified by the way in which judges typically justify their decisions. Even in the 
Supreme Court, in which cases tend to be selected on the basis of divisions 
among lower courts, judicial opinions rarely admit of the slightest doubt. This 
holds true even in the face of dissents that profess a similar degree of confi-
dence, often combined with outrage. Professional norms likely contribute to 
this style of presentation. Dan Simon is also likely right to see in it the influ-
ence of “coherence-based reasoning”—a process in which the decisionmaker 
continuously revisits and revises her assessments of equivocal pieces of evi-
dence to match her assessments of unequivocal ones, until any trace of doubt is 
vanquished.179 But whatever its cause, this style of writing is part of what 
makes Supreme Court decisions themselves an incitement to illiberal status 
competition. Like the scenarios featured in our study, constitutional cases tend 
to be culturally fraught. The dogmatic certitude with which the Justices express 
their views—and the tone of indignant incredulity they adopt in the face of dis-
agreement—make those who see things differently view the Court as parti-
san.180 Predictably, they say so, typically in terms that reciprocate the Court’s 
own stridency and provoke still more acrimony in the public realm. 
So our recommendation here is that judges throttle back. In place of the 
muscular self-confidence that now dominates opinion writing, we propose an 
idiom of aporia in which judges acknowledge the difficulty of the controversies 
before them.181 This isn’t to say judges should be dishonest; on the contrary, it 
is to say that they should endeavor to avoid misleading either themselves or 
others when they are dealing with genuinely difficult cases, as is nearly always 
true in the Supreme Court. A style of justification that acknowledges rather 
than abjures doubt, we predict, would likely have salutary effects comparable 
to the ones observed in experiments in which members of opposing groups are 
obliged to begin their deliberations by identifying the feature of the other side’s 
 
179. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal De-
cision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 544-45 (2004). 
180. See Secunda, supra note 148, at 142. 
181. “Aporia” refers to a distinctive mode of argumentative engagement that recogniz-
es—both in the substance and form of the analysis—the intrinsic complexity of the issue at 
hand. See generally Nicholas Rescher, Aporetic Method in Philosophy, 41 REV. 
METAPHYSICS 283 (1987) . For a more detailed defense of aporetic reasoning in judicial opin-
ions, see Kahan, Neutral Principles, supra note 5, at 59-66. 
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case that gives them the most pause. Such a gesture would be especially valua-
ble in cases where judges can predict that their decisions will give rise to cul-
turally oriented conflict. By confirming that judges actually see the complexity 
of such cases, the use of a more judicious idiom of explanation would enable 
defeated parties to see that judges are not blinded by partisanship, and spare cit-
izens who share the losing side’s perspective from the insult of being accused 
(implicitly or explicitly) of bias themselves.182 Those citizens would then have 
less reason to attribute bad faith to the judges—and citizens who share those 
judges’ points of view would in turn have less reason to strike back in kind. 
Citizens generally would thus be less likely to form an exaggerated perception 
of cultural polarization surrounding such decisions. And without that percep-
tion, judicial determinations would simply be less symbolic of the triumph of 
one side’s or the other’s worldview.183 
CONCLUSION 
In the competitive jurisprudence of visual-sense impressions, Justice Scalia 
has a record of one and one. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, he was on 
the losing side of a 6-3 decision that upheld (most elements of) an injunction 
against abortion clinic protestors the majority found to have “interfered with 
ingress to and egress from the clinic.”184 Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia im-
plored “[a]nyone seriously interested in what this case was about” to watch a 
videotape of the demonstrators’ behavior, predicting that doing so would leave 
any fair-minded viewer “aghast at” the Court’s complicity in stifling “run-of-
the-mine” forms of persuasive speech.185 In Scott v. Harris, Justice Scalia 
wrote for the eight-Justice majority that put decisive weight on a video to sup-
port its conclusion that “no reasonable jury” could find a citizen fleeing the po-
 
182. Lawyers might conceivably find this reasoning style less persuasive, or at least less 
aesthetically pleasing, than would ordinary citizens. But what sort of argumentation lawyers 
find compelling is no doubt shaped by what courts, by example, condition them to regard as 
such. Indeed, the likely impact of an idiom of judicial aporia on the legal professional culture 
(including the teaching of law) could magnify its contribution to reducing cultural status 
conflict in law and politics generally.  
183. Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice also furnishes support for the hypothesis 
that an idiom of humility would enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decisionmaking. 
Tyler has amassed a large body of empirical data showing that the public’s willingness to 
assent to and abide by legal directives is influenced much more by citizens’ perceptions that 
they have been treated fairly than by their agreement with the substance of those directives. 
See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49-57 (2002); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW (1990). In a study conducted with Gregory Mitchell, Tyler has found that 
citizens are more likely to see Supreme Court decisions as legitimate, in particular, when 
they believe the Justices have given careful and respectful attention to rejected arguments. 
See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 156, at 770-72, 774-77.  
184. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 771 (1994). 
185. Id. at 786 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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lice “was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life.”186 Justice Scalia 
took the lone dissenter, Justice Stevens (who joined the relevant portion of the 
majority opinion in Madsen), to be implying that the Court’s “reaction to the 
videotape is somehow idiosyncratic” and that the Court was “misrepresenting 
its contents.”187 In response, Justice Scalia announced that “[w]e are happy to 
allow the videotape to speak for itself” and took the unprecedented step of or-
dering the Clerk of the Court to post a link to it on the Supreme Court’s web-
site.188 
We don’t mean to suggest that Justice Scalia’s perceptions were faulty in 
either case, that he was misreporting his impressions, or that he was guilty of 
any sort of inconsistency. Rather, we draw attention to his reactions toward the 
Justices who purported to see things differently to help us summarize the major 
themes of this paper. 
One is that what people see will often be a reflection of what they value. In 
Madsen, Justice Scalia pulled no punches in attributing the majority’s decision 
to partisanship.189 We obviously have no idea what the majority saw or why. 
But the results of our experiment confirm that people who have different cul-
tural worldviews will often disagree with each other about whether political 
protestors are engaged in conduct—blocking, obstructing, intimidating—or 
speech—impassioned advocacy intended only to persuade. Indeed, whether in-
dividuals of any particular worldview see one thing or the other, we found, de-
pends on whether they have been led to believe the demonstrators’ cause is one 
that defies or affirms their own values. In a previous study, we found that indi-
viduals’ cultural identities also predicted whether they would agree or disagree 
with the Court’s perception of the Scott video.190 Contrary to what Justice Scal-
ia suggests in Madsen, however, the influence of values on perceptions in such 
cases is not smoking-gun evidence of bad faith. Rather it is the signature of cul-
turally motivated cognition, a normally unconscious process. 
A second point is that the ability to recognize the effect of values on fact 
perceptions typically involves a signature asymmetry. Like Justice Scalia, we 
all readily discern this dynamic in others, yet we tend to be completely oblivi-
ous to it in ourselves. In fact, much like Justice Scalia, we treat the contradic-
tion between what we plainly see and what others say they see as confirmation 
that our antagonists are biased, not that we ourselves are vulnerable to distor-
tions of perception. Known as naive realism, this dynamic is integral to cultural 
cognition. 
 
186. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
187. Id. at 378 n.5. 
188. Id. 
189. See 512 U.S. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Today the ad hoc nullification machine [that drives the Court’s abortion jurispru-
dence] claims its latest, greatest, and most surprising victim: the First Amendment.”). 
190. See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 903-04. 
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Still another point illustrated by Justice Scalia’s reactions is the ubiquity of 
cultural cognition. The disposition to form perceptions of fact congenial to 
one’s values isn’t a pathological personality trait191 or a style of reasoning inte-
gral to a distinctive, and distinctively malign, ideology.192 (Indeed, the appeal 
of those sorts of surmises could themselves be seen as evidence of the disposi-
tion to form culturally congenial perceptions of how the world works.) Precise-
ly because cultural cognition doesn’t discriminate on the basis of worldview, 
members of all groups can anticipate that as a result of it they, like Justice Scal-
ia, will likely find themselves members of a disappointed minority in some em-
pirical or factual debates and a member of the incredulous majority in others. 
Finally, the setting for Justice Scalia’s reactions—constitutional adjudica-
tion—underscores the danger that culturally motivated cognition can pose to 
the realization of liberal political ideals. The quieting of struggles between rival 
sects to impose their contested visions of the good life by violent means (with 
or without the law) is the signal achievement of liberal democratic culture.193 
Yet despite widespread consensus that the legitimate object of law is attainment 
of prosperity, security, health, and other secular goods, cultural polarization 
persists because of the contribution that values make to citizens’ perceptions of 
policy-relevant facts. Seemingly empirical debates thus become infused with 
partisan meanings, triggering symbolic status competition among groups intent 
on securing policy choices that affirm rather than denigrate their ideals. We ex-
pect the Constitution to repel threats to pluralism whether they arise from the 
conscious and willful designs of tyrannical governors or from the chaotic and 
spontaneous dynamics of popular self-rule. But if jurors and judges are as vul-
nerable to cultural cognition as are lawmakers, law enforcers, and ordinary citi-
zens—if their worldviews, too, are perceived to exert a decisive influence on 
how they see the world—then constitutional decisionmaking will not dispel 
cognitive illiberalism. On the contrary, it will just amplify it. 
Our goal in conducting this study has been to awaken constitutional theory 
to this dilemma. The traditional focus of constitutional theorists has been the fit 
between constitutional norms and the doctrines used to implement them. The 
fit—or lack thereof—between those doctrines and the psychological disposi-
tions of constitutional decisionmakers has been almost entirely neglected. As a 
result, constitutional theory stands mute in the face of the persistent failure of 
constitutional adjudication to achieve its most fundamental objectives.  
 
191. But cf. T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950) (proposing 
that right-wing values reflect a personality trait). 
192. But cf. John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003) (suggesting that motivated reasoning is uniquely associated 
with conservative ideology).  
193. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: 
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977) (identifying the power 
of commercial institutions to pacify violent sectarian rivalries as one of the historical bases 
of the affinity between liberal political theory and classical liberal economics).  
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Demonstrating the impact of cultural cognition on the speech-conduct dis-
tinction is admittedly only a modest first step toward remedying this deficiency. 
But by using the compass of psychological realism to orient our inquiry, we 
hope we’ve at least clarified the direction constitutional theory needs to go. 
APPENDIX: STUDY INSTRUMENT 
This Appendix reproduces the text of the materials used to perform our 
study. Headings have been added for the reader’s convenience. 
I. CULTURAL WORLDVIEW ITEMS 
A. Individualism  
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in 
making decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements? [Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately 
disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree] 
1. IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
2. SHARM. Sometimes the government needs to make laws that keep people 
from hurting themselves.  
3. IPROTECT. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people 
from themselves.  
4. IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their 
lives.  
5. SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, 
even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.  
6. SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can 
make so they don’t get in the way of what’s good for society.  
B. Hierarchy 
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimi-
nation. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? 
[Possible responses: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, 
slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree] 
1. HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
2. EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth 
was more equal.  
3. ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich 
and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.  
4. EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious prob-
lem in our society.  
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5. HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups 
don’t want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.  
6. HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.  
II. VIGNETTE 
INTRO1. In this study, we want you to imagine you are on a jury in a civil 
trial. The facts are based on an actual case. 
In the case, protestors are suing police officers and the police department. 
The protestors are members of a group that opposes [permitting doctors and 
nurses to perform abortions at the request of pregnant women/the ban on allow-
ing openly gay and lesbian citizens to join the military]. The protestors allege 
that the police violated their rights by ordering them to end their protest at [an 
abortion clinic/a college campus recruitment center the day the Army was 
scheduled to interview students who were considering enlisting]. The protestors 
are asking the court to issue an opinion that (1) declares that the police violated 
their rights and (2) orders the police not to interfere with future protests similar 
to this one. They also seek monetary damages of $10,000 from the police de-
partment. 
It is not disputed that the protestors had a permit to conduct a “lawful pro-
test,” and that the police stopped the protest by ordering the protestors to leave 
the vicinity of the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center] 30 minutes after 
the protest started. 
What is disputed is whether the protestors were conducting the demonstra-
tion in a manner that violated a local ordinance known as the [Freedom to Ex-
ercise Reproductive Rights Law/Freedom to Serve with Honor Law]. 
The [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law/Freedom to Serve 
with Honor Law] was passed by the city council after a court found that the 
city’s police could not stop protests at [abortion clinics/military recruitment 
sites] without clear guidelines. The law makes it illegal for  
any person to intentionally (1) interfere with, (2) obstruct, (3) intimidate, or 
(4) threaten any person who is seeking to enter, exit, or remain lawfully on 
premises of any [hospital or medical clinic that is licensed to perform abor-
tions/facility in which the U.S. military is engaged in recruitment activity]. 
If a police officer “observes or is furnished with reliable evidence” that a 
person or group is violating the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights 
Law/Freedom to Serve with Honor Law], the police can order the person or 
group to stop and leave the area around the [abortion clinic/recruitment facili-
ty]. Courts have found the guidelines in the new law to be sufficiently clear, 
and otherwise lawful.  
The only question in this case is whether the police properly used their au-
thority under the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law/Freedom to 
Serve with Honor Law] to end the protest. The police assert that they ordered 
the protestors to stop and leave because the protestors were violating the [Free-
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dom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law/Freedom to Serve with Honor Law]. 
The protestors assert that they were only expressing their views, in a manner 
that did not violate the law. 
The key evidence in the case is a video of the protest. The parties agree the 
video gives an accurate impression of the nature of the protestors’ conduct and 
conditions near the entrance of the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]. 
But they disagree about whose position the video most supports: the position of 
the police officers, who assert that the protestors were “intimidating, interfer-
ing, obstructing or threatening” people trying to enter the [abortion clin-
ic/campus recruitment center]; or the position of the protestors, who say they 
were merely expressing their views in a lawful manner. Deciding who is right 
is the task for you as a member of the jury. 
Note: The video contains introductory and transitional text based on wit-
ness statements. The parties agree the text is accurate. Because the U.S. Consti-
tution prohibits the police from breaking up a protest based on the messages the 
protestors are trying to communicate, the parties agreed that the messages on 
signs of the protestors should be visually blurred to assure that those messages 
did not affect the jury’s decision one way or the other. 
Please view the video. 
III. VIDEOS 
The abortion clinic condition is available at videoreview12, Abortion Clin-
ic 11 22 2010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
k8ru-FE2v_8. 
The recruitment center condition is available at videoreview12, Re-
cruit_Center_11192010.m4v, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=X3PJACpL53k. 
IV. RESPONSE MEASURES 
INTRO2. Now we’d like you to indicate your view of the facts. Below are 
factual assertions made by parties in the case. Please indicate how strongly you 
disagree or agree with these factual assertions. [Possible responses: strongly 
disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately 
agree, strongly agree] 
1. DTHREAT. The protestors threatened individuals seeking to enter, exit, or 
remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment 
center]. 
2. DINTIMIDATE. The protestors intimidated individuals seeking to enter, 
exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic/campus re-
cruitment center]. 
KAHAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2012 11:40 AM 
April 2012] COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM 905 
3. DOBSTRUCT. The protestors obstructed individuals seeking to enter, exit, 
or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic/campus recruit-
ment center]. 
4. DINTERFERE. The protestors interfered with individuals seeking to enter, 
exit, or remain lawfully on the premises of the [abortion clinic/campus re-
cruitment center]. 
5. PINTENDED. The protestors intended only to persuade people not to go 
into the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center], not to physically inter-
fere with, intimidate, obstruct, or threaten anybody. 
6. PDIRECTOR. It is more likely the director asked the police to break up the 
protest because the director and others found dealing with the protestors 
annoying than because the protestors were interfering with, intimidating, 
obstructing, or threatening anyone. 
7. PLISTEN. The people who decided not to enter the [abortion clin-
ic/campus recruitment center] did not feel threatened or intimidated; they 
just didn’t want to have to listen to what the protestors were saying. 
8. DBLOCK. The police had reasonable evidence to believe the protestors 
were obstructing, intimidating, assaulting, or threatening people trying to 
enter the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]. 
9. PANNOY. It is more likely the police broke up the protest because they 
found dealing with the entire situation annoying or inconvenient than be-
cause they believed the protestors were violating the law.  
10. DVIOLENCE. There was a risk that the protestors might resort to violence 
if anyone tried to enter. 
11. DSPIT. One or more of the protestors spat at someone who wanted to enter 
the building. 
12. DSHOVE. One or more of the protestors attempted to shove people trying 
to enter. 
13. DCONTACT. The protestors touched one or more of the people trying to 
enter. 
14. PPERSUADE. It is likely that at least some people who were going to en-
ter the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center] changed their mind be-
cause they found the protestors’ message convincing. 
15. DDIRECTOR. The director was in a better position than the police to see 
everything that was going on, so it made sense for the police to stop the 
protest when he told them the protestors were interfering with or intimidat-
ing people trying to enter the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]. 
16. DHELP. People trying to enter asked the police to help them. 
17. DSCREAM. One or more of the protestors screamed in the faces of people 
who wanted to enter the [abortion clinic/campus recruitment center]. 
INTRO3. Now we would like to know how you would vote to decide the 
case. Your decision should be based on your view of the facts and on the law, 
which is displayed on the right-hand side of your screen. Please indicate how 
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strongly you agree or disagree with these statements. [Possible responses: 
strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moder-
ately agree, strongly agree]  
 
Freedom to Exercise Reproductive 
Rights Law 
 
Section 1. Prohibited Conduct. It 
is against the law for any person to in-
tentionally (1) interfere with, (2) ob-
struct, (3) intimidate, or (4) threaten 
any person who is seeking to enter, ex-
it, or remain lawfully on premises of 
any hospital or medical clinic that is 
licensed to perform abortions. 
Section 2. Order to Desist. If a law 
enforcement officer observes or is fur-
nished with reliable evidence that any 
person is engaged in behavior in viola-
tion of section 1, the officer may order 
such person to desist and to leave the 
immediate vicinity. 
Freedom to Serve with Honor Law 
 
 
Section 1. Prohibited Conduct. It is 
against the law for any person to inten-
tionally (1) interfere with, (2) obstruct, 
(3) intimidate, or (4) threaten any per-
son who is seeking to enter, exit, or 
remain lawfully on premises of any fa-
cility in which the U.S. military is en-
gaged in recruitment activity. 
Section 2. Order to Desist. If a law 
enforcement officer observes or is fur-
nished with reliable evidence that any 
person is engaged in behavior in viola-
tion of section 1, the officer may order 
such person to desist and to leave the 
immediate vicinity. 
 
18. LIABILITY. I would vote to find the police did not have the evidence nec-
essary to stop the protest under the [Freedom to Exercise Reproductive 
Rights Law/Freedom to Serve with Honor Law]. 
19. NOLIABILITY. I would vote to find the protestors were violating the 
[Freedom to Exercise Reproductive Rights Law/Freedom to Serve with 
Honor Law]. 
20. DAMAGES. I would vote to order the police to pay damages to the protes-
tors. 
21. ORDER. I would vote to order the police not to interfere with protests un-
der conditions like the ones shown in the video. 
